2 * Simplified MAC Kernel (smack) security module
4 * This file contains the smack hook function implementations.
7 * Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
8 * Jarkko Sakkinen <ext-jarkko.2.sakkinen@nokia.com>
10 * Copyright (C) 2007 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
12 * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
13 * Copyright (C) 2010 Nokia Corporation
15 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
16 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
17 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
20 #include <linux/xattr.h>
21 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
22 #include <linux/mount.h>
23 #include <linux/stat.h>
25 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
27 #include <linux/tcp.h>
28 #include <linux/udp.h>
29 #include <linux/slab.h>
30 #include <linux/mutex.h>
31 #include <linux/pipe_fs_i.h>
32 #include <net/netlabel.h>
33 #include <net/cipso_ipv4.h>
34 #include <linux/audit.h>
35 #include <linux/magic.h>
36 #include <linux/dcache.h>
39 #define task_security(task) (task_cred_xxx((task), security))
41 #define TRANS_TRUE "TRUE"
42 #define TRANS_TRUE_SIZE 4
45 * smk_fetch - Fetch the smack label from a file.
46 * @ip: a pointer to the inode
47 * @dp: a pointer to the dentry
49 * Returns a pointer to the master list entry for the Smack label
50 * or NULL if there was no label to fetch.
52 static char *smk_fetch(const char *name, struct inode *ip, struct dentry *dp)
55 char in[SMK_LABELLEN];
57 if (ip->i_op->getxattr == NULL)
60 rc = ip->i_op->getxattr(dp, name, in, SMK_LABELLEN);
64 return smk_import(in, rc);
68 * new_inode_smack - allocate an inode security blob
69 * @smack: a pointer to the Smack label to use in the blob
71 * Returns the new blob or NULL if there's no memory available
73 struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(char *smack)
75 struct inode_smack *isp;
77 isp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct inode_smack), GFP_KERNEL);
81 isp->smk_inode = smack;
83 mutex_init(&isp->smk_lock);
89 * new_task_smack - allocate a task security blob
90 * @smack: a pointer to the Smack label to use in the blob
92 * Returns the new blob or NULL if there's no memory available
94 static struct task_smack *new_task_smack(char *task, char *forked, gfp_t gfp)
96 struct task_smack *tsp;
98 tsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), gfp);
102 tsp->smk_task = task;
103 tsp->smk_forked = forked;
104 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsp->smk_rules);
105 mutex_init(&tsp->smk_rules_lock);
111 * smk_copy_rules - copy a rule set
112 * @nhead - new rules header pointer
113 * @ohead - old rules header pointer
115 * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM on error
117 static int smk_copy_rules(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
120 struct smack_rule *nrp;
121 struct smack_rule *orp;
124 INIT_LIST_HEAD(nhead);
126 list_for_each_entry_rcu(orp, ohead, list) {
127 nrp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_rule), gfp);
133 list_add_rcu(&nrp->list, nhead);
140 * We he, that is fun!
144 * smack_ptrace_access_check - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH
145 * @ctp: child task pointer
146 * @mode: ptrace attachment mode
148 * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
150 * Do the capability checks, and require read and write.
152 static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
155 struct smk_audit_info ad;
158 rc = cap_ptrace_access_check(ctp, mode);
162 tsp = smk_of_task(task_security(ctp));
163 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
164 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, ctp);
166 rc = smk_curacc(tsp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
171 * smack_ptrace_traceme - Smack approval on PTRACE_TRACEME
172 * @ptp: parent task pointer
174 * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
176 * Do the capability checks, and require read and write.
178 static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
181 struct smk_audit_info ad;
184 rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(ptp);
188 tsp = smk_of_task(task_security(ptp));
189 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
190 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, ptp);
192 rc = smk_curacc(tsp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
197 * smack_syslog - Smack approval on syslog
198 * @type: message type
200 * Require that the task has the floor label
202 * Returns 0 on success, error code otherwise.
204 static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file)
207 char *sp = smk_of_current();
209 if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
212 if (sp != smack_known_floor.smk_known)
224 * smack_sb_alloc_security - allocate a superblock blob
225 * @sb: the superblock getting the blob
227 * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
229 static int smack_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
231 struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
233 sbsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_smack), GFP_KERNEL);
238 sbsp->smk_root = smack_known_floor.smk_known;
239 sbsp->smk_default = smack_known_floor.smk_known;
240 sbsp->smk_floor = smack_known_floor.smk_known;
241 sbsp->smk_hat = smack_known_hat.smk_known;
242 sbsp->smk_initialized = 0;
243 spin_lock_init(&sbsp->smk_sblock);
245 sb->s_security = sbsp;
251 * smack_sb_free_security - free a superblock blob
252 * @sb: the superblock getting the blob
255 static void smack_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
257 kfree(sb->s_security);
258 sb->s_security = NULL;
262 * smack_sb_copy_data - copy mount options data for processing
263 * @orig: where to start
264 * @smackopts: mount options string
266 * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
268 * Copy the Smack specific mount options out of the mount
271 static int smack_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *smackopts)
273 char *cp, *commap, *otheropts, *dp;
275 otheropts = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
276 if (otheropts == NULL)
279 for (cp = orig, commap = orig; commap != NULL; cp = commap + 1) {
280 if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSDEFAULT) == cp)
282 else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSFLOOR) == cp)
284 else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSHAT) == cp)
286 else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSROOT) == cp)
291 commap = strchr(cp, ',');
300 strcpy(orig, otheropts);
301 free_page((unsigned long)otheropts);
307 * smack_sb_kern_mount - Smack specific mount processing
308 * @sb: the file system superblock
309 * @flags: the mount flags
310 * @data: the smack mount options
312 * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure
314 static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
316 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
317 struct inode *inode = root->d_inode;
318 struct superblock_smack *sp = sb->s_security;
319 struct inode_smack *isp;
324 spin_lock(&sp->smk_sblock);
325 if (sp->smk_initialized != 0) {
326 spin_unlock(&sp->smk_sblock);
329 sp->smk_initialized = 1;
330 spin_unlock(&sp->smk_sblock);
332 for (op = data; op != NULL; op = commap) {
333 commap = strchr(op, ',');
337 if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSHAT, strlen(SMK_FSHAT)) == 0) {
338 op += strlen(SMK_FSHAT);
339 nsp = smk_import(op, 0);
342 } else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSFLOOR, strlen(SMK_FSFLOOR)) == 0) {
343 op += strlen(SMK_FSFLOOR);
344 nsp = smk_import(op, 0);
347 } else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSDEFAULT,
348 strlen(SMK_FSDEFAULT)) == 0) {
349 op += strlen(SMK_FSDEFAULT);
350 nsp = smk_import(op, 0);
352 sp->smk_default = nsp;
353 } else if (strncmp(op, SMK_FSROOT, strlen(SMK_FSROOT)) == 0) {
354 op += strlen(SMK_FSROOT);
355 nsp = smk_import(op, 0);
362 * Initialize the root inode.
364 isp = inode->i_security;
366 inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(sp->smk_root);
368 isp->smk_inode = sp->smk_root;
374 * smack_sb_statfs - Smack check on statfs
375 * @dentry: identifies the file system in question
377 * Returns 0 if current can read the floor of the filesystem,
378 * and error code otherwise
380 static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
382 struct superblock_smack *sbp = dentry->d_sb->s_security;
384 struct smk_audit_info ad;
386 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
387 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
389 rc = smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ, &ad);
394 * smack_sb_mount - Smack check for mounting
401 * Returns 0 if current can write the floor of the filesystem
402 * being mounted on, an error code otherwise.
404 static int smack_sb_mount(char *dev_name, struct path *path,
405 char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
407 struct superblock_smack *sbp = path->mnt->mnt_sb->s_security;
408 struct smk_audit_info ad;
410 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
411 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, *path);
413 return smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
417 * smack_sb_umount - Smack check for unmounting
418 * @mnt: file system to unmount
421 * Returns 0 if current can write the floor of the filesystem
422 * being unmounted, an error code otherwise.
424 static int smack_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
426 struct superblock_smack *sbp;
427 struct smk_audit_info ad;
430 path.dentry = mnt->mnt_root;
433 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
434 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, path);
436 sbp = mnt->mnt_sb->s_security;
437 return smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
445 * smack_bprm_set_creds - set creds for exec
446 * @bprm: the exec information
448 * Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -ENOMEM otherwise
450 static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
452 struct task_smack *tsp = bprm->cred->security;
453 struct inode_smack *isp;
457 rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
461 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
464 if (bprm->file == NULL || bprm->file->f_dentry == NULL)
467 dp = bprm->file->f_dentry;
469 if (dp->d_inode == NULL)
472 isp = dp->d_inode->i_security;
474 if (isp->smk_task != NULL)
475 tsp->smk_task = isp->smk_task;
485 * smack_inode_alloc_security - allocate an inode blob
486 * @inode: the inode in need of a blob
488 * Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -ENOMEM otherwise
490 static int smack_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
492 inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(smk_of_current());
493 if (inode->i_security == NULL)
499 * smack_inode_free_security - free an inode blob
500 * @inode: the inode with a blob
502 * Clears the blob pointer in inode
504 static void smack_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
506 kfree(inode->i_security);
507 inode->i_security = NULL;
511 * smack_inode_init_security - copy out the smack from an inode
515 * @name: where to put the attribute name
516 * @value: where to put the attribute value
517 * @len: where to put the length of the attribute
519 * Returns 0 if it all works out, -ENOMEM if there's no memory
521 static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
522 const struct qstr *qstr, char **name,
523 void **value, size_t *len)
525 struct smack_known *skp;
526 char *csp = smk_of_current();
527 char *isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
528 char *dsp = smk_of_inode(dir);
532 *name = kstrdup(XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, GFP_KERNEL);
538 skp = smk_find_entry(csp);
540 may = smk_access_entry(csp, dsp, &skp->smk_rules);
544 * If the access rule allows transmutation and
545 * the directory requests transmutation then
546 * by all means transmute.
548 if (may > 0 && ((may & MAY_TRANSMUTE) != 0) &&
549 smk_inode_transmutable(dir))
552 *value = kstrdup(isp, GFP_KERNEL);
558 *len = strlen(isp) + 1;
564 * smack_inode_link - Smack check on link
565 * @old_dentry: the existing object
567 * @new_dentry: the new object
569 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
571 static int smack_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
572 struct dentry *new_dentry)
575 struct smk_audit_info ad;
578 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
579 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry);
581 isp = smk_of_inode(old_dentry->d_inode);
582 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
584 if (rc == 0 && new_dentry->d_inode != NULL) {
585 isp = smk_of_inode(new_dentry->d_inode);
586 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, new_dentry);
587 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
594 * smack_inode_unlink - Smack check on inode deletion
595 * @dir: containing directory object
596 * @dentry: file to unlink
598 * Returns 0 if current can write the containing directory
599 * and the object, error code otherwise
601 static int smack_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
603 struct inode *ip = dentry->d_inode;
604 struct smk_audit_info ad;
607 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
608 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
611 * You need write access to the thing you're unlinking
613 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(ip), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
616 * You also need write access to the containing directory
618 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, NULL);
619 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir);
620 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
626 * smack_inode_rmdir - Smack check on directory deletion
627 * @dir: containing directory object
628 * @dentry: directory to unlink
630 * Returns 0 if current can write the containing directory
631 * and the directory, error code otherwise
633 static int smack_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
635 struct smk_audit_info ad;
638 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
639 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
642 * You need write access to the thing you're removing
644 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
647 * You also need write access to the containing directory
649 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, NULL);
650 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir);
651 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
658 * smack_inode_rename - Smack check on rename
659 * @old_inode: the old directory
660 * @old_dentry: unused
661 * @new_inode: the new directory
662 * @new_dentry: unused
664 * Read and write access is required on both the old and
667 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
669 static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode,
670 struct dentry *old_dentry,
671 struct inode *new_inode,
672 struct dentry *new_dentry)
676 struct smk_audit_info ad;
678 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
679 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry);
681 isp = smk_of_inode(old_dentry->d_inode);
682 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
684 if (rc == 0 && new_dentry->d_inode != NULL) {
685 isp = smk_of_inode(new_dentry->d_inode);
686 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, new_dentry);
687 rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
693 * smack_inode_permission - Smack version of permission()
694 * @inode: the inode in question
695 * @mask: the access requested
697 * This is the important Smack hook.
699 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, -EACCES otherwise
701 static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
703 struct smk_audit_info ad;
704 int no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
706 mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
708 * No permission to check. Existence test. Yup, it's there.
713 /* May be droppable after audit */
716 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
717 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, inode);
718 return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), mask, &ad);
722 * smack_inode_setattr - Smack check for setting attributes
723 * @dentry: the object
724 * @iattr: for the force flag
726 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
728 static int smack_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
730 struct smk_audit_info ad;
732 * Need to allow for clearing the setuid bit.
734 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
736 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
737 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
739 return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
743 * smack_inode_getattr - Smack check for getting attributes
745 * @dentry: the object
747 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
749 static int smack_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
751 struct smk_audit_info ad;
754 path.dentry = dentry;
757 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
758 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, path);
759 return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
763 * smack_inode_setxattr - Smack check for setting xattrs
764 * @dentry: the object
765 * @name: name of the attribute
770 * This protects the Smack attribute explicitly.
772 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
774 static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
775 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
777 struct smk_audit_info ad;
780 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
781 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
782 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 ||
783 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
784 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
785 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
788 * check label validity here so import wont fail on
791 if (size == 0 || size >= SMK_LABELLEN ||
792 smk_import(value, size) == NULL)
794 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
795 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
797 if (size != TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ||
798 strncmp(value, TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)
801 rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
803 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
804 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
807 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
813 * smack_inode_post_setxattr - Apply the Smack update approved above
815 * @name: attribute name
816 * @value: attribute value
817 * @size: attribute size
820 * Set the pointer in the inode blob to the entry found
821 * in the master label list.
823 static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
824 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
827 struct inode_smack *isp = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
829 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) {
830 nsp = smk_import(value, size);
832 isp->smk_inode = nsp;
834 isp->smk_inode = smack_known_invalid.smk_known;
835 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0) {
836 nsp = smk_import(value, size);
840 isp->smk_task = smack_known_invalid.smk_known;
841 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
842 nsp = smk_import(value, size);
846 isp->smk_mmap = smack_known_invalid.smk_known;
847 } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0)
848 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
854 * smack_inode_getxattr - Smack check on getxattr
855 * @dentry: the object
858 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
860 static int smack_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
862 struct smk_audit_info ad;
864 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
865 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
867 return smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
871 * smack_inode_removexattr - Smack check on removexattr
872 * @dentry: the object
873 * @name: name of the attribute
875 * Removing the Smack attribute requires CAP_MAC_ADMIN
877 * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
879 static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
881 struct inode_smack *isp;
882 struct smk_audit_info ad;
885 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
886 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
887 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 ||
888 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
889 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0 ||
890 strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP)) {
891 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
894 rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
896 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
897 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
899 rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dentry->d_inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
902 isp = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
903 isp->smk_task = NULL;
904 isp->smk_mmap = NULL;
911 * smack_inode_getsecurity - get smack xattrs
913 * @name: attribute name
914 * @buffer: where to put the result
917 * Returns the size of the attribute or an error code
919 static int smack_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode,
920 const char *name, void **buffer,
923 struct socket_smack *ssp;
925 struct super_block *sbp;
926 struct inode *ip = (struct inode *)inode;
931 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) {
932 isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
933 ilen = strlen(isp) + 1;
939 * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets.
942 if (sbp->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
946 if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
949 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
951 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
953 else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0)
958 ilen = strlen(isp) + 1;
969 * smack_inode_listsecurity - list the Smack attributes
971 * @buffer: where they go
972 * @buffer_size: size of buffer
974 * Returns 0 on success, -EINVAL otherwise
976 static int smack_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
979 int len = strlen(XATTR_NAME_SMACK);
981 if (buffer != NULL && len <= buffer_size) {
982 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, len);
989 * smack_inode_getsecid - Extract inode's security id
990 * @inode: inode to extract the info from
991 * @secid: where result will be saved
993 static void smack_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
995 struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
997 *secid = smack_to_secid(isp->smk_inode);
1005 * smack_file_permission - Smack check on file operations
1011 * Should access checks be done on each read or write?
1012 * UNICOS and SELinux say yes.
1013 * Trusted Solaris, Trusted Irix, and just about everyone else says no.
1015 * I'll say no for now. Smack does not do the frequent
1016 * label changing that SELinux does.
1018 static int smack_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
1024 * smack_file_alloc_security - assign a file security blob
1027 * The security blob for a file is a pointer to the master
1028 * label list, so no allocation is done.
1032 static int smack_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
1034 file->f_security = smk_of_current();
1039 * smack_file_free_security - clear a file security blob
1042 * The security blob for a file is a pointer to the master
1043 * label list, so no memory is freed.
1045 static void smack_file_free_security(struct file *file)
1047 file->f_security = NULL;
1051 * smack_file_ioctl - Smack check on ioctls
1056 * Relies heavily on the correct use of the ioctl command conventions.
1058 * Returns 0 if allowed, error code otherwise
1060 static int smack_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
1064 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1066 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1067 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1069 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
1070 rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1072 if (rc == 0 && (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ))
1073 rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_READ, &ad);
1079 * smack_file_lock - Smack check on file locking
1083 * Returns 0 if current has write access, error code otherwise
1085 static int smack_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
1087 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1089 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1090 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1091 return smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1095 * smack_file_fcntl - Smack check on fcntl
1097 * @cmd: what action to check
1100 * Generally these operations are harmless.
1101 * File locking operations present an obvious mechanism
1102 * for passing information, so they require write access.
1104 * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise
1106 static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
1109 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1119 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
1120 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1121 rc = smk_curacc(file->f_security, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1132 * Check permissions for a mmap operation. The @file may be NULL, e.g.
1133 * if mapping anonymous memory.
1134 * @file contains the file structure for file to map (may be NULL).
1135 * @reqprot contains the protection requested by the application.
1136 * @prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
1137 * @flags contains the operational flags.
1138 * Return 0 if permission is granted.
1140 static int smack_file_mmap(struct file *file,
1141 unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot,
1142 unsigned long flags, unsigned long addr,
1143 unsigned long addr_only)
1145 struct smack_known *skp;
1146 struct smack_rule *srp;
1147 struct task_smack *tsp;
1151 struct inode_smack *isp;
1158 /* do DAC check on address space usage */
1159 rc = cap_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
1160 if (rc || addr_only)
1163 if (file == NULL || file->f_dentry == NULL)
1166 dp = file->f_dentry;
1168 if (dp->d_inode == NULL)
1171 isp = dp->d_inode->i_security;
1172 if (isp->smk_mmap == NULL)
1174 msmack = isp->smk_mmap;
1176 tsp = current_security();
1177 sp = smk_of_current();
1178 skp = smk_find_entry(sp);
1183 * For each Smack rule associated with the subject
1184 * label verify that the SMACK64MMAP also has access
1185 * to that rule's object label.
1187 list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, &skp->smk_rules, list) {
1188 osmack = srp->smk_object;
1190 * Matching labels always allows access.
1192 if (msmack == osmack)
1195 * If there is a matching local rule take
1196 * that into account as well.
1198 may = smk_access_entry(srp->smk_subject, osmack,
1201 may = srp->smk_access;
1203 may &= srp->smk_access;
1205 * If may is zero the SMACK64MMAP subject can't
1206 * possibly have less access.
1212 * Fetch the global list entry.
1213 * If there isn't one a SMACK64MMAP subject
1214 * can't have as much access as current.
1216 skp = smk_find_entry(msmack);
1217 mmay = smk_access_entry(msmack, osmack, &skp->smk_rules);
1218 if (mmay == -ENOENT) {
1223 * If there is a local entry it modifies the
1224 * potential access, too.
1226 tmay = smk_access_entry(msmack, osmack, &tsp->smk_rules);
1227 if (tmay != -ENOENT)
1231 * If there is any access available to current that is
1232 * not available to a SMACK64MMAP subject
1235 if ((may | mmay) != mmay) {
1247 * smack_file_set_fowner - set the file security blob value
1248 * @file: object in question
1251 * Further research may be required on this one.
1253 static int smack_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
1255 file->f_security = smk_of_current();
1260 * smack_file_send_sigiotask - Smack on sigio
1261 * @tsk: The target task
1262 * @fown: the object the signal come from
1265 * Allow a privileged task to get signals even if it shouldn't
1267 * Returns 0 if a subject with the object's smack could
1268 * write to the task, an error code otherwise.
1270 static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
1271 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
1275 char *tsp = smk_of_task(tsk->cred->security);
1276 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1279 * struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file
1281 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
1283 /* we don't log here as rc can be overriden */
1284 rc = smk_access(file->f_security, tsp, MAY_WRITE, NULL);
1285 if (rc != 0 && has_capability(tsk, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
1288 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
1289 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tsk);
1290 smack_log(file->f_security, tsp, MAY_WRITE, rc, &ad);
1295 * smack_file_receive - Smack file receive check
1298 * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise
1300 static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
1303 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1305 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
1306 smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
1308 * This code relies on bitmasks.
1310 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1312 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
1315 return smk_curacc(file->f_security, may, &ad);
1319 * smack_dentry_open - Smack dentry open processing
1323 * Set the security blob in the file structure.
1327 static int smack_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
1329 struct inode_smack *isp = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1331 file->f_security = isp->smk_inode;
1341 * smack_cred_alloc_blank - "allocate" blank task-level security credentials
1342 * @new: the new credentials
1343 * @gfp: the atomicity of any memory allocations
1345 * Prepare a blank set of credentials for modification. This must allocate all
1346 * the memory the LSM module might require such that cred_transfer() can
1347 * complete without error.
1349 static int smack_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
1351 struct task_smack *tsp;
1353 tsp = new_task_smack(NULL, NULL, gfp);
1357 cred->security = tsp;
1364 * smack_cred_free - "free" task-level security credentials
1365 * @cred: the credentials in question
1368 static void smack_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
1370 struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security;
1371 struct smack_rule *rp;
1372 struct list_head *l;
1373 struct list_head *n;
1377 cred->security = NULL;
1379 list_for_each_safe(l, n, &tsp->smk_rules) {
1380 rp = list_entry(l, struct smack_rule, list);
1381 list_del(&rp->list);
1388 * smack_cred_prepare - prepare new set of credentials for modification
1389 * @new: the new credentials
1390 * @old: the original credentials
1391 * @gfp: the atomicity of any memory allocations
1393 * Prepare a new set of credentials for modification.
1395 static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1398 struct task_smack *old_tsp = old->security;
1399 struct task_smack *new_tsp;
1402 new_tsp = new_task_smack(old_tsp->smk_task, old_tsp->smk_task, gfp);
1403 if (new_tsp == NULL)
1406 rc = smk_copy_rules(&new_tsp->smk_rules, &old_tsp->smk_rules, gfp);
1410 new->security = new_tsp;
1415 * smack_cred_transfer - Transfer the old credentials to the new credentials
1416 * @new: the new credentials
1417 * @old: the original credentials
1419 * Fill in a set of blank credentials from another set of credentials.
1421 static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
1423 struct task_smack *old_tsp = old->security;
1424 struct task_smack *new_tsp = new->security;
1426 new_tsp->smk_task = old_tsp->smk_task;
1427 new_tsp->smk_forked = old_tsp->smk_task;
1428 mutex_init(&new_tsp->smk_rules_lock);
1429 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new_tsp->smk_rules);
1432 /* cbs copy rule list */
1436 * smack_kernel_act_as - Set the subjective context in a set of credentials
1437 * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified.
1438 * @secid: specifies the security ID to be set
1440 * Set the security data for a kernel service.
1442 static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
1444 struct task_smack *new_tsp = new->security;
1445 char *smack = smack_from_secid(secid);
1450 new_tsp->smk_task = smack;
1455 * smack_kernel_create_files_as - Set the file creation label in a set of creds
1456 * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified
1457 * @inode: points to the inode to use as a reference
1459 * Set the file creation context in a set of credentials to the same
1460 * as the objective context of the specified inode
1462 static int smack_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new,
1463 struct inode *inode)
1465 struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
1466 struct task_smack *tsp = new->security;
1468 tsp->smk_forked = isp->smk_inode;
1469 tsp->smk_task = isp->smk_inode;
1474 * smk_curacc_on_task - helper to log task related access
1475 * @p: the task object
1476 * @access: the access requested
1477 * @caller: name of the calling function for audit
1479 * Return 0 if access is permitted
1481 static int smk_curacc_on_task(struct task_struct *p, int access,
1484 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1486 smk_ad_init(&ad, caller, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
1487 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
1488 return smk_curacc(smk_of_task(task_security(p)), access, &ad);
1492 * smack_task_setpgid - Smack check on setting pgid
1493 * @p: the task object
1496 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
1498 static int smack_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
1500 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
1504 * smack_task_getpgid - Smack access check for getpgid
1505 * @p: the object task
1507 * Returns 0 if current can read the object task, error code otherwise
1509 static int smack_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
1511 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
1515 * smack_task_getsid - Smack access check for getsid
1516 * @p: the object task
1518 * Returns 0 if current can read the object task, error code otherwise
1520 static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
1522 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
1526 * smack_task_getsecid - get the secid of the task
1527 * @p: the object task
1528 * @secid: where to put the result
1530 * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the smack label.
1532 static void smack_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
1534 *secid = smack_to_secid(smk_of_task(task_security(p)));
1538 * smack_task_setnice - Smack check on setting nice
1539 * @p: the task object
1542 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
1544 static int smack_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
1548 rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
1550 rc = smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
1555 * smack_task_setioprio - Smack check on setting ioprio
1556 * @p: the task object
1559 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
1561 static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
1565 rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
1567 rc = smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
1572 * smack_task_getioprio - Smack check on reading ioprio
1573 * @p: the task object
1575 * Return 0 if read access is permitted
1577 static int smack_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
1579 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
1583 * smack_task_setscheduler - Smack check on setting scheduler
1584 * @p: the task object
1588 * Return 0 if read access is permitted
1590 static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
1594 rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p);
1596 rc = smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
1601 * smack_task_getscheduler - Smack check on reading scheduler
1602 * @p: the task object
1604 * Return 0 if read access is permitted
1606 static int smack_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
1608 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
1612 * smack_task_movememory - Smack check on moving memory
1613 * @p: the task object
1615 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
1617 static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
1619 return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
1623 * smack_task_kill - Smack check on signal delivery
1624 * @p: the task object
1627 * @secid: identifies the smack to use in lieu of current's
1629 * Return 0 if write access is permitted
1631 * The secid behavior is an artifact of an SELinux hack
1632 * in the USB code. Someday it may go away.
1634 static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
1637 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1639 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
1640 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
1642 * Sending a signal requires that the sender
1643 * can write the receiver.
1646 return smk_curacc(smk_of_task(task_security(p)), MAY_WRITE,
1649 * If the secid isn't 0 we're dealing with some USB IO
1650 * specific behavior. This is not clean. For one thing
1651 * we can't take privilege into account.
1653 return smk_access(smack_from_secid(secid),
1654 smk_of_task(task_security(p)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1658 * smack_task_wait - Smack access check for waiting
1659 * @p: task to wait for
1661 * Returns 0 if current can wait for p, error code otherwise
1663 static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
1665 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1666 char *sp = smk_of_current();
1667 char *tsp = smk_of_forked(task_security(p));
1670 /* we don't log here, we can be overriden */
1671 rc = smk_access(tsp, sp, MAY_WRITE, NULL);
1676 * Allow the operation to succeed if either task
1677 * has privilege to perform operations that might
1678 * account for the smack labels having gotten to
1679 * be different in the first place.
1681 * This breaks the strict subject/object access
1682 * control ideal, taking the object's privilege
1683 * state into account in the decision as well as
1686 if (capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE) || has_capability(p, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
1688 /* we log only if we didn't get overriden */
1690 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
1691 smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
1692 smack_log(tsp, sp, MAY_WRITE, rc, &ad);
1697 * smack_task_to_inode - copy task smack into the inode blob
1698 * @p: task to copy from
1699 * @inode: inode to copy to
1701 * Sets the smack pointer in the inode security blob
1703 static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
1705 struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
1706 isp->smk_inode = smk_of_task(task_security(p));
1714 * smack_sk_alloc_security - Allocate a socket blob
1717 * @gfp_flags: memory allocation flags
1719 * Assign Smack pointers to current
1721 * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM is there's no memory
1723 static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
1725 char *csp = smk_of_current();
1726 struct socket_smack *ssp;
1728 ssp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct socket_smack), gfp_flags);
1734 ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
1736 sk->sk_security = ssp;
1742 * smack_sk_free_security - Free a socket blob
1745 * Clears the blob pointer
1747 static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
1749 kfree(sk->sk_security);
1753 * smack_host_label - check host based restrictions
1754 * @sip: the object end
1756 * looks for host based access restrictions
1758 * This version will only be appropriate for really small sets of single label
1759 * hosts. The caller is responsible for ensuring that the RCU read lock is
1760 * taken before calling this function.
1762 * Returns the label of the far end or NULL if it's not special.
1764 static char *smack_host_label(struct sockaddr_in *sip)
1766 struct smk_netlbladdr *snp;
1767 struct in_addr *siap = &sip->sin_addr;
1769 if (siap->s_addr == 0)
1772 list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_netlbladdr_list, list)
1774 * we break after finding the first match because
1775 * the list is sorted from longest to shortest mask
1776 * so we have found the most specific match
1778 if ((&snp->smk_host.sin_addr)->s_addr ==
1779 (siap->s_addr & (&snp->smk_mask)->s_addr)) {
1780 /* we have found the special CIPSO option */
1781 if (snp->smk_label == smack_cipso_option)
1783 return snp->smk_label;
1790 * smack_set_catset - convert a capset to netlabel mls categories
1791 * @catset: the Smack categories
1792 * @sap: where to put the netlabel categories
1794 * Allocates and fills attr.mls.cat
1796 static void smack_set_catset(char *catset, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap)
1807 sap->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT;
1808 sap->attr.mls.cat = netlbl_secattr_catmap_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC);
1809 sap->attr.mls.cat->startbit = 0;
1811 for (cat = 1, cp = catset, byte = 0; byte < SMK_LABELLEN; cp++, byte++)
1812 for (m = 0x80; m != 0; m >>= 1, cat++) {
1815 rc = netlbl_secattr_catmap_setbit(sap->attr.mls.cat,
1821 * smack_to_secattr - fill a secattr from a smack value
1822 * @smack: the smack value
1823 * @nlsp: where the result goes
1825 * Casey says that CIPSO is good enough for now.
1826 * It can be used to effect.
1827 * It can also be abused to effect when necessary.
1828 * Apologies to the TSIG group in general and GW in particular.
1830 static void smack_to_secattr(char *smack, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *nlsp)
1832 struct smack_cipso cipso;
1835 nlsp->domain = smack;
1836 nlsp->flags = NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN | NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL;
1838 rc = smack_to_cipso(smack, &cipso);
1840 nlsp->attr.mls.lvl = cipso.smk_level;
1841 smack_set_catset(cipso.smk_catset, nlsp);
1843 nlsp->attr.mls.lvl = smack_cipso_direct;
1844 smack_set_catset(smack, nlsp);
1849 * smack_netlabel - Set the secattr on a socket
1851 * @labeled: socket label scheme
1853 * Convert the outbound smack value (smk_out) to a
1854 * secattr and attach it to the socket.
1856 * Returns 0 on success or an error code
1858 static int smack_netlabel(struct sock *sk, int labeled)
1860 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
1861 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
1865 * Usually the netlabel code will handle changing the
1866 * packet labeling based on the label.
1867 * The case of a single label host is different, because
1868 * a single label host should never get a labeled packet
1869 * even though the label is usually associated with a packet
1873 bh_lock_sock_nested(sk);
1875 if (ssp->smk_out == smack_net_ambient ||
1876 labeled == SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET)
1877 netlbl_sock_delattr(sk);
1879 netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
1880 smack_to_secattr(ssp->smk_out, &secattr);
1881 rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, sk->sk_family, &secattr);
1882 netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
1892 * smack_netlbel_send - Set the secattr on a socket and perform access checks
1894 * @sap: the destination address
1896 * Set the correct secattr for the given socket based on the destination
1897 * address and perform any outbound access checks needed.
1899 * Returns 0 on success or an error code.
1902 static int smack_netlabel_send(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap)
1907 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
1908 struct smk_audit_info ad;
1911 hostsp = smack_host_label(sap);
1912 if (hostsp != NULL) {
1913 sk_lbl = SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET;
1915 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET);
1916 ad.a.u.net.family = sap->sin_family;
1917 ad.a.u.net.dport = sap->sin_port;
1918 ad.a.u.net.v4info.daddr = sap->sin_addr.s_addr;
1920 rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, hostsp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
1922 sk_lbl = SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET;
1929 return smack_netlabel(sk, sk_lbl);
1933 * smack_inode_setsecurity - set smack xattrs
1934 * @inode: the object
1935 * @name: attribute name
1936 * @value: attribute value
1937 * @size: size of the attribute
1940 * Sets the named attribute in the appropriate blob
1942 * Returns 0 on success, or an error code
1944 static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
1945 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
1948 struct inode_smack *nsp = inode->i_security;
1949 struct socket_smack *ssp;
1950 struct socket *sock;
1953 if (value == NULL || size > SMK_LABELLEN || size == 0)
1956 sp = smk_import(value, size);
1960 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) {
1961 nsp->smk_inode = sp;
1962 nsp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
1966 * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets.
1968 if (inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
1971 sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
1972 if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
1975 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
1977 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
1979 else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0) {
1981 if (sock->sk->sk_family != PF_UNIX) {
1982 rc = smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
1985 "Smack: \"%s\" netlbl error %d.\n",
1995 * smack_socket_post_create - finish socket setup
1997 * @family: protocol family
2002 * Sets the netlabel information on the socket
2004 * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
2006 static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
2007 int type, int protocol, int kern)
2009 if (family != PF_INET || sock->sk == NULL)
2012 * Set the outbound netlbl.
2014 return smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
2018 * smack_socket_connect - connect access check
2020 * @sap: the other end
2021 * @addrlen: size of sap
2023 * Verifies that a connection may be possible
2025 * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
2027 static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap,
2030 if (sock->sk == NULL || sock->sk->sk_family != PF_INET)
2032 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
2035 return smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, (struct sockaddr_in *)sap);
2039 * smack_flags_to_may - convert S_ to MAY_ values
2040 * @flags: the S_ value
2042 * Returns the equivalent MAY_ value
2044 static int smack_flags_to_may(int flags)
2048 if (flags & S_IRUGO)
2050 if (flags & S_IWUGO)
2052 if (flags & S_IXUGO)
2059 * smack_msg_msg_alloc_security - Set the security blob for msg_msg
2064 static int smack_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
2066 msg->security = smk_of_current();
2071 * smack_msg_msg_free_security - Clear the security blob for msg_msg
2074 * Clears the blob pointer
2076 static void smack_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
2078 msg->security = NULL;
2082 * smack_of_shm - the smack pointer for the shm
2085 * Returns a pointer to the smack value
2087 static char *smack_of_shm(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
2089 return (char *)shp->shm_perm.security;
2093 * smack_shm_alloc_security - Set the security blob for shm
2098 static int smack_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
2100 struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &shp->shm_perm;
2102 isp->security = smk_of_current();
2107 * smack_shm_free_security - Clear the security blob for shm
2110 * Clears the blob pointer
2112 static void smack_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
2114 struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &shp->shm_perm;
2116 isp->security = NULL;
2120 * smk_curacc_shm : check if current has access on shm
2122 * @access : access requested
2124 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2126 static int smk_curacc_shm(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int access)
2128 char *ssp = smack_of_shm(shp);
2129 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2132 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
2133 ad.a.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.id;
2135 return smk_curacc(ssp, access, &ad);
2139 * smack_shm_associate - Smack access check for shm
2141 * @shmflg: access requested
2143 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2145 static int smack_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
2149 may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg);
2150 return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may);
2154 * smack_shm_shmctl - Smack access check for shm
2156 * @cmd: what it wants to do
2158 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2160 static int smack_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
2173 may = MAY_READWRITE;
2178 * System level information.
2184 return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may);
2188 * smack_shm_shmat - Smack access for shmat
2191 * @shmflg: access requested
2193 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2195 static int smack_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp, char __user *shmaddr,
2200 may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg);
2201 return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may);
2205 * smack_of_sem - the smack pointer for the sem
2208 * Returns a pointer to the smack value
2210 static char *smack_of_sem(struct sem_array *sma)
2212 return (char *)sma->sem_perm.security;
2216 * smack_sem_alloc_security - Set the security blob for sem
2221 static int smack_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
2223 struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &sma->sem_perm;
2225 isp->security = smk_of_current();
2230 * smack_sem_free_security - Clear the security blob for sem
2233 * Clears the blob pointer
2235 static void smack_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
2237 struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &sma->sem_perm;
2239 isp->security = NULL;
2243 * smk_curacc_sem : check if current has access on sem
2245 * @access : access requested
2247 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2249 static int smk_curacc_sem(struct sem_array *sma, int access)
2251 char *ssp = smack_of_sem(sma);
2252 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2255 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
2256 ad.a.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.id;
2258 return smk_curacc(ssp, access, &ad);
2262 * smack_sem_associate - Smack access check for sem
2264 * @semflg: access requested
2266 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2268 static int smack_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
2272 may = smack_flags_to_may(semflg);
2273 return smk_curacc_sem(sma, may);
2277 * smack_sem_shmctl - Smack access check for sem
2279 * @cmd: what it wants to do
2281 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2283 static int smack_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
2301 may = MAY_READWRITE;
2306 * System level information
2313 return smk_curacc_sem(sma, may);
2317 * smack_sem_semop - Smack checks of semaphore operations
2323 * Treated as read and write in all cases.
2325 * Returns 0 if access is allowed, error code otherwise
2327 static int smack_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma, struct sembuf *sops,
2328 unsigned nsops, int alter)
2330 return smk_curacc_sem(sma, MAY_READWRITE);
2334 * smack_msg_alloc_security - Set the security blob for msg
2339 static int smack_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
2341 struct kern_ipc_perm *kisp = &msq->q_perm;
2343 kisp->security = smk_of_current();
2348 * smack_msg_free_security - Clear the security blob for msg
2351 * Clears the blob pointer
2353 static void smack_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
2355 struct kern_ipc_perm *kisp = &msq->q_perm;
2357 kisp->security = NULL;
2361 * smack_of_msq - the smack pointer for the msq
2364 * Returns a pointer to the smack value
2366 static char *smack_of_msq(struct msg_queue *msq)
2368 return (char *)msq->q_perm.security;
2372 * smk_curacc_msq : helper to check if current has access on msq
2374 * @access : access requested
2376 * return 0 if current has access, error otherwise
2378 static int smk_curacc_msq(struct msg_queue *msq, int access)
2380 char *msp = smack_of_msq(msq);
2381 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2384 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
2385 ad.a.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.id;
2387 return smk_curacc(msp, access, &ad);
2391 * smack_msg_queue_associate - Smack access check for msg_queue
2393 * @msqflg: access requested
2395 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2397 static int smack_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
2401 may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg);
2402 return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may);
2406 * smack_msg_queue_msgctl - Smack access check for msg_queue
2408 * @cmd: what it wants to do
2410 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2412 static int smack_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
2423 may = MAY_READWRITE;
2428 * System level information
2435 return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may);
2439 * smack_msg_queue_msgsnd - Smack access check for msg_queue
2442 * @msqflg: access requested
2444 * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
2446 static int smack_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
2451 may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg);
2452 return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may);
2456 * smack_msg_queue_msgsnd - Smack access check for msg_queue
2463 * Returns 0 if current has read and write access, error code otherwise
2465 static int smack_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
2466 struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode)
2468 return smk_curacc_msq(msq, MAY_READWRITE);
2472 * smack_ipc_permission - Smack access for ipc_permission()
2473 * @ipp: the object permissions
2474 * @flag: access requested
2476 * Returns 0 if current has read and write access, error code otherwise
2478 static int smack_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, short flag)
2480 char *isp = ipp->security;
2481 int may = smack_flags_to_may(flag);
2482 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2485 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
2486 ad.a.u.ipc_id = ipp->id;
2488 return smk_curacc(isp, may, &ad);
2492 * smack_ipc_getsecid - Extract smack security id
2493 * @ipp: the object permissions
2494 * @secid: where result will be saved
2496 static void smack_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, u32 *secid)
2498 char *smack = ipp->security;
2500 *secid = smack_to_secid(smack);
2504 * smack_d_instantiate - Make sure the blob is correct on an inode
2505 * @opt_dentry: dentry where inode will be attached
2506 * @inode: the object
2508 * Set the inode's security blob if it hasn't been done already.
2510 static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
2512 struct super_block *sbp;
2513 struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
2514 struct inode_smack *isp;
2515 char *csp = smk_of_current();
2518 char trattr[TRANS_TRUE_SIZE];
2525 isp = inode->i_security;
2527 mutex_lock(&isp->smk_lock);
2529 * If the inode is already instantiated
2530 * take the quick way out
2532 if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_INSTANT)
2536 sbsp = sbp->s_security;
2538 * We're going to use the superblock default label
2539 * if there's no label on the file.
2541 final = sbsp->smk_default;
2544 * If this is the root inode the superblock
2545 * may be in the process of initialization.
2546 * If that is the case use the root value out
2547 * of the superblock.
2549 if (opt_dentry->d_parent == opt_dentry) {
2550 isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root;
2551 isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
2556 * This is pretty hackish.
2557 * Casey says that we shouldn't have to do
2558 * file system specific code, but it does help
2559 * with keeping it simple.
2561 switch (sbp->s_magic) {
2564 * Casey says that it's a little embarrassing
2565 * that the smack file system doesn't do
2566 * extended attributes.
2568 final = smack_known_star.smk_known;
2572 * Casey says pipes are easy (?)
2574 final = smack_known_star.smk_known;
2576 case DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC:
2578 * devpts seems content with the label of the task.
2579 * Programs that change smack have to treat the
2586 * Socket access is controlled by the socket
2587 * structures associated with the task involved.
2589 final = smack_known_star.smk_known;
2591 case PROC_SUPER_MAGIC:
2593 * Casey says procfs appears not to care.
2594 * The superblock default suffices.
2599 * Device labels should come from the filesystem,
2600 * but watch out, because they're volitile,
2601 * getting recreated on every reboot.
2603 final = smack_known_star.smk_known;
2607 * If a smack value has been set we want to use it,
2608 * but since tmpfs isn't giving us the opportunity
2609 * to set mount options simulate setting the
2610 * superblock default.
2614 * This isn't an understood special case.
2615 * Get the value from the xattr.
2619 * UNIX domain sockets use lower level socket data.
2621 if (S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode)) {
2622 final = smack_known_star.smk_known;
2626 * No xattr support means, alas, no SMACK label.
2627 * Use the aforeapplied default.
2628 * It would be curious if the label of the task
2629 * does not match that assigned.
2631 if (inode->i_op->getxattr == NULL)
2634 * Get the dentry for xattr.
2636 dp = dget(opt_dentry);
2637 fetched = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACK, inode, dp);
2638 if (fetched != NULL) {
2640 if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
2642 inode->i_op->getxattr(dp,
2643 XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE,
2644 trattr, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE);
2645 if (strncmp(trattr, TRANS_TRUE,
2646 TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) == 0)
2647 transflag = SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
2650 isp->smk_task = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp);
2651 isp->smk_mmap = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP, inode, dp);
2658 isp->smk_inode = csp;
2660 isp->smk_inode = final;
2662 isp->smk_flags |= (SMK_INODE_INSTANT | transflag);
2665 mutex_unlock(&isp->smk_lock);
2670 * smack_getprocattr - Smack process attribute access
2671 * @p: the object task
2672 * @name: the name of the attribute in /proc/.../attr
2673 * @value: where to put the result
2675 * Places a copy of the task Smack into value
2677 * Returns the length of the smack label or an error code
2679 static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
2684 if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
2687 cp = kstrdup(smk_of_task(task_security(p)), GFP_KERNEL);
2697 * smack_setprocattr - Smack process attribute setting
2698 * @p: the object task
2699 * @name: the name of the attribute in /proc/.../attr
2700 * @value: the value to set
2701 * @size: the size of the value
2703 * Sets the Smack value of the task. Only setting self
2704 * is permitted and only with privilege
2706 * Returns the length of the smack label or an error code
2708 static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
2709 void *value, size_t size)
2712 struct task_smack *tsp;
2713 struct task_smack *oldtsp;
2718 * Changing another process' Smack value is too dangerous
2719 * and supports no sane use case.
2724 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2727 if (value == NULL || size == 0 || size >= SMK_LABELLEN)
2730 if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
2733 newsmack = smk_import(value, size);
2734 if (newsmack == NULL)
2738 * No process is ever allowed the web ("@") label.
2740 if (newsmack == smack_known_web.smk_known)
2743 oldtsp = p->cred->security;
2744 new = prepare_creds();
2748 tsp = new_task_smack(newsmack, oldtsp->smk_forked, GFP_KERNEL);
2753 rc = smk_copy_rules(&tsp->smk_rules, &oldtsp->smk_rules, GFP_KERNEL);
2757 new->security = tsp;
2763 * smack_unix_stream_connect - Smack access on UDS
2765 * @other: the other sock
2768 * Return 0 if a subject with the smack of sock could access
2769 * an object with the smack of other, otherwise an error code
2771 static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
2772 struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk)
2774 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk_security;
2775 struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk_security;
2776 struct socket_smack *nsp = newsk->sk_security;
2777 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2780 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET);
2781 smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other);
2783 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
2784 rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
2787 * Cross reference the peer labels for SO_PEERSEC.
2790 nsp->smk_packet = ssp->smk_out;
2791 ssp->smk_packet = osp->smk_out;
2798 * smack_unix_may_send - Smack access on UDS
2800 * @other: the other socket
2802 * Return 0 if a subject with the smack of sock could access
2803 * an object with the smack of other, otherwise an error code
2805 static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
2807 struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
2808 struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk->sk_security;
2809 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2812 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET);
2813 smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other->sk);
2815 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
2816 rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
2822 * smack_socket_sendmsg - Smack check based on destination host
2825 * @size: the size of the message
2827 * Return 0 if the current subject can write to the destination
2828 * host. This is only a question if the destination is a single
2831 static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
2834 struct sockaddr_in *sip = (struct sockaddr_in *) msg->msg_name;
2837 * Perfectly reasonable for this to be NULL
2839 if (sip == NULL || sip->sin_family != AF_INET)
2842 return smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, sip);
2846 * smack_from_secattr - Convert a netlabel attr.mls.lvl/attr.mls.cat pair to smack
2847 * @sap: netlabel secattr
2848 * @ssp: socket security information
2850 * Returns a pointer to a Smack label found on the label list.
2852 static char *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
2853 struct socket_smack *ssp)
2855 struct smack_known *skp;
2856 char smack[SMK_LABELLEN];
2860 if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) != 0) {
2862 * Looks like a CIPSO packet.
2863 * If there are flags but no level netlabel isn't
2864 * behaving the way we expect it to.
2866 * Get the categories, if any
2867 * Without guidance regarding the smack value
2868 * for the packet fall back on the network
2871 memset(smack, '\0', SMK_LABELLEN);
2872 if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) != 0)
2874 pcat = netlbl_secattr_catmap_walk(
2875 sap->attr.mls.cat, pcat + 1);
2878 smack_catset_bit(pcat, smack);
2881 * If it is CIPSO using smack direct mapping
2882 * we are already done. WeeHee.
2884 if (sap->attr.mls.lvl == smack_cipso_direct) {
2886 * The label sent is usually on the label list.
2888 * If it is not we may still want to allow the
2891 * If the recipient is accepting all packets
2892 * because it is using the star ("*") label
2893 * for SMACK64IPIN provide the web ("@") label
2894 * so that a directed response will succeed.
2895 * This is not very correct from a MAC point
2896 * of view, but gets around the problem that
2897 * locking prevents adding the newly discovered
2898 * label to the list.
2899 * The case where the recipient is not using
2900 * the star label should obviously fail.
2901 * The easy way to do this is to provide the
2902 * star label as the subject label.
2904 skp = smk_find_entry(smack);
2906 return skp->smk_known;
2908 ssp->smk_in == smack_known_star.smk_known)
2909 return smack_known_web.smk_known;
2910 return smack_known_star.smk_known;
2913 * Look it up in the supplied table if it is not
2916 sp = smack_from_cipso(sap->attr.mls.lvl, smack);
2919 if (ssp != NULL && ssp->smk_in == smack_known_star.smk_known)
2920 return smack_known_web.smk_known;
2921 return smack_known_star.smk_known;
2923 if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) != 0) {
2925 * Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid.
2927 sp = smack_from_secid(sap->attr.secid);
2929 * This has got to be a bug because it is
2930 * impossible to specify a fallback without
2931 * specifying the label, which will ensure
2932 * it has a secid, and the only way to get a
2933 * secid is from a fallback.
2939 * Without guidance regarding the smack value
2940 * for the packet fall back on the network
2943 return smack_net_ambient;
2947 * smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb - Smack packet delivery access check
2951 * Returns 0 if the packet should be delivered, an error code otherwise
2953 static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
2955 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
2956 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
2959 struct smk_audit_info ad;
2960 if (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6)
2964 * Translate what netlabel gave us.
2966 netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
2968 rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, sk->sk_family, &secattr);
2970 csp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
2972 csp = smack_net_ambient;
2974 netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
2977 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET);
2978 ad.a.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
2979 ad.a.u.net.netif = skb->skb_iif;
2980 ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
2983 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end
2984 * be able to write here. Read access is not required.
2985 * This is the simplist possible security model
2988 rc = smk_access(csp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
2990 netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc, 0);
2995 * smack_socket_getpeersec_stream - pull in packet label
2997 * @optval: user's destination
2998 * @optlen: size thereof
3001 * returns zero on success, an error code otherwise
3003 static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
3004 char __user *optval,
3005 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
3007 struct socket_smack *ssp;
3012 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
3013 if (ssp->smk_packet != NULL) {
3014 rcp = ssp->smk_packet;
3015 slen = strlen(rcp) + 1;
3020 else if (copy_to_user(optval, rcp, slen) != 0)
3023 if (put_user(slen, optlen) != 0)
3031 * smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram - pull in packet label
3032 * @sock: the peer socket
3034 * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet
3036 * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
3038 static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
3039 struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
3042 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
3043 struct socket_smack *ssp = NULL;
3045 int family = PF_UNSPEC;
3046 u32 s = 0; /* 0 is the invalid secid */
3050 if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
3052 else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
3055 if (family == PF_UNSPEC && sock != NULL)
3056 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3058 if (family == PF_UNIX) {
3059 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
3060 s = smack_to_secid(ssp->smk_out);
3061 } else if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3063 * Translate what netlabel gave us.
3065 if (sock != NULL && sock->sk != NULL)
3066 ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
3067 netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
3068 rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
3070 sp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
3071 s = smack_to_secid(sp);
3073 netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
3082 * smack_sock_graft - Initialize a newly created socket with an existing sock
3084 * @parent: parent socket
3086 * Set the smk_{in,out} state of an existing sock based on the process that
3087 * is creating the new socket.
3089 static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
3091 struct socket_smack *ssp;
3094 (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6))
3097 ssp = sk->sk_security;
3098 ssp->smk_in = ssp->smk_out = smk_of_current();
3099 /* cssp->smk_packet is already set in smack_inet_csk_clone() */
3103 * smack_inet_conn_request - Smack access check on connect
3104 * @sk: socket involved
3108 * Returns 0 if a task with the packet label could write to
3109 * the socket, otherwise an error code
3111 static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
3112 struct request_sock *req)
3114 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
3115 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
3116 struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
3117 struct sockaddr_in addr;
3121 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3123 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
3124 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
3127 netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
3128 rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
3130 sp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
3132 sp = smack_known_huh.smk_known;
3133 netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
3136 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET);
3137 ad.a.u.net.family = family;
3138 ad.a.u.net.netif = skb->skb_iif;
3139 ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
3142 * Receiving a packet requires that the other end be able to write
3143 * here. Read access is not required.
3145 rc = smk_access(sp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
3150 * Save the peer's label in the request_sock so we can later setup
3151 * smk_packet in the child socket so that SO_PEERCRED can report it.
3153 req->peer_secid = smack_to_secid(sp);
3156 * We need to decide if we want to label the incoming connection here
3157 * if we do we only need to label the request_sock and the stack will
3158 * propagate the wire-label to the sock when it is created.
3161 addr.sin_addr.s_addr = hdr->saddr;
3163 if (smack_host_label(&addr) == NULL) {
3165 netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
3166 smack_to_secattr(sp, &secattr);
3167 rc = netlbl_req_setattr(req, &secattr);
3168 netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
3171 netlbl_req_delattr(req);
3178 * smack_inet_csk_clone - Copy the connection information to the new socket
3179 * @sk: the new socket
3180 * @req: the connection's request_sock
3182 * Transfer the connection's peer label to the newly created socket.
3184 static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,
3185 const struct request_sock *req)
3187 struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
3189 if (req->peer_secid != 0)
3190 ssp->smk_packet = smack_from_secid(req->peer_secid);
3192 ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
3196 * Key management security hooks
3198 * Casey has not tested key support very heavily.
3199 * The permission check is most likely too restrictive.
3200 * If you care about keys please have a look.
3205 * smack_key_alloc - Set the key security blob
3207 * @cred: the credentials to use
3210 * No allocation required
3214 static int smack_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
3215 unsigned long flags)
3217 key->security = smk_of_task(cred->security);
3222 * smack_key_free - Clear the key security blob
3225 * Clear the blob pointer
3227 static void smack_key_free(struct key *key)
3229 key->security = NULL;
3233 * smack_key_permission - Smack access on a key
3234 * @key_ref: gets to the object
3235 * @cred: the credentials to use
3238 * Return 0 if the task has read and write to the object,
3239 * an error code otherwise
3241 static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
3242 const struct cred *cred, key_perm_t perm)
3245 struct smk_audit_info ad;
3246 char *tsp = smk_of_task(cred->security);
3248 keyp = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
3252 * If the key hasn't been initialized give it access so that
3255 if (keyp->security == NULL)
3258 * This should not occur
3263 smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY);
3264 ad.a.u.key_struct.key = keyp->serial;
3265 ad.a.u.key_struct.key_desc = keyp->description;
3267 return smk_access(tsp, keyp->security,
3268 MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
3270 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
3275 * Audit requires a unique representation of each Smack specific
3276 * rule. This unique representation is used to distinguish the
3277 * object to be audited from remaining kernel objects and also
3278 * works as a glue between the audit hooks.
3280 * Since repository entries are added but never deleted, we'll use
3281 * the smack_known label address related to the given audit rule as
3282 * the needed unique representation. This also better fits the smack
3283 * model where nearly everything is a label.
3288 * smack_audit_rule_init - Initialize a smack audit rule
3289 * @field: audit rule fields given from user-space (audit.h)
3290 * @op: required testing operator (=, !=, >, <, ...)
3291 * @rulestr: smack label to be audited
3292 * @vrule: pointer to save our own audit rule representation
3294 * Prepare to audit cases where (@field @op @rulestr) is true.
3295 * The label to be audited is created if necessay.
3297 static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
3299 char **rule = (char **)vrule;
3302 if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
3305 if (op != Audit_equal && op != Audit_not_equal)
3308 *rule = smk_import(rulestr, 0);
3314 * smack_audit_rule_known - Distinguish Smack audit rules
3315 * @krule: rule of interest, in Audit kernel representation format
3317 * This is used to filter Smack rules from remaining Audit ones.
3318 * If it's proved that this rule belongs to us, the
3319 * audit_rule_match hook will be called to do the final judgement.
3321 static int smack_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
3323 struct audit_field *f;
3326 for (i = 0; i < krule->field_count; i++) {
3327 f = &krule->fields[i];
3329 if (f->type == AUDIT_SUBJ_USER || f->type == AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
3337 * smack_audit_rule_match - Audit given object ?
3338 * @secid: security id for identifying the object to test
3339 * @field: audit rule flags given from user-space
3340 * @op: required testing operator
3341 * @vrule: smack internal rule presentation
3342 * @actx: audit context associated with the check
3344 * The core Audit hook. It's used to take the decision of
3345 * whether to audit or not to audit a given object.
3347 static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
3348 struct audit_context *actx)
3354 audit_log(actx, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
3355 "Smack: missing rule\n");
3359 if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
3362 smack = smack_from_secid(secid);
3365 * No need to do string comparisons. If a match occurs,
3366 * both pointers will point to the same smack_known
3369 if (op == Audit_equal)
3370 return (rule == smack);
3371 if (op == Audit_not_equal)
3372 return (rule != smack);
3378 * smack_audit_rule_free - free smack rule representation
3379 * @vrule: rule to be freed.
3381 * No memory was allocated.
3383 static void smack_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
3388 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
3391 * smack_secid_to_secctx - return the smack label for a secid
3392 * @secid: incoming integer
3393 * @secdata: destination
3394 * @seclen: how long it is
3396 * Exists for networking code.
3398 static int smack_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
3400 char *sp = smack_from_secid(secid);
3404 *seclen = strlen(sp);
3409 * smack_secctx_to_secid - return the secid for a smack label
3410 * @secdata: smack label
3411 * @seclen: how long result is
3412 * @secid: outgoing integer
3414 * Exists for audit and networking code.
3416 static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
3418 *secid = smack_to_secid(secdata);
3423 * smack_release_secctx - don't do anything.
3427 * Exists to make sure nothing gets done, and properly
3429 static void smack_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
3433 static int smack_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
3435 return smack_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
3438 static int smack_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
3440 return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
3443 static int smack_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
3446 len = smack_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, ctx, true);
3454 struct security_operations smack_ops = {
3457 .ptrace_access_check = smack_ptrace_access_check,
3458 .ptrace_traceme = smack_ptrace_traceme,
3459 .syslog = smack_syslog,
3461 .sb_alloc_security = smack_sb_alloc_security,
3462 .sb_free_security = smack_sb_free_security,
3463 .sb_copy_data = smack_sb_copy_data,
3464 .sb_kern_mount = smack_sb_kern_mount,
3465 .sb_statfs = smack_sb_statfs,
3466 .sb_mount = smack_sb_mount,
3467 .sb_umount = smack_sb_umount,
3469 .bprm_set_creds = smack_bprm_set_creds,
3471 .inode_alloc_security = smack_inode_alloc_security,
3472 .inode_free_security = smack_inode_free_security,
3473 .inode_init_security = smack_inode_init_security,
3474 .inode_link = smack_inode_link,
3475 .inode_unlink = smack_inode_unlink,
3476 .inode_rmdir = smack_inode_rmdir,
3477 .inode_rename = smack_inode_rename,
3478 .inode_permission = smack_inode_permission,
3479 .inode_setattr = smack_inode_setattr,
3480 .inode_getattr = smack_inode_getattr,
3481 .inode_setxattr = smack_inode_setxattr,
3482 .inode_post_setxattr = smack_inode_post_setxattr,
3483 .inode_getxattr = smack_inode_getxattr,
3484 .inode_removexattr = smack_inode_removexattr,
3485 .inode_getsecurity = smack_inode_getsecurity,
3486 .inode_setsecurity = smack_inode_setsecurity,
3487 .inode_listsecurity = smack_inode_listsecurity,
3488 .inode_getsecid = smack_inode_getsecid,
3490 .file_permission = smack_file_permission,
3491 .file_alloc_security = smack_file_alloc_security,
3492 .file_free_security = smack_file_free_security,
3493 .file_ioctl = smack_file_ioctl,
3494 .file_lock = smack_file_lock,
3495 .file_fcntl = smack_file_fcntl,
3496 .file_mmap = smack_file_mmap,
3497 .file_set_fowner = smack_file_set_fowner,
3498 .file_send_sigiotask = smack_file_send_sigiotask,
3499 .file_receive = smack_file_receive,
3501 .dentry_open = smack_dentry_open,
3503 .cred_alloc_blank = smack_cred_alloc_blank,
3504 .cred_free = smack_cred_free,
3505 .cred_prepare = smack_cred_prepare,
3506 .cred_transfer = smack_cred_transfer,
3507 .kernel_act_as = smack_kernel_act_as,
3508 .kernel_create_files_as = smack_kernel_create_files_as,
3509 .task_setpgid = smack_task_setpgid,
3510 .task_getpgid = smack_task_getpgid,
3511 .task_getsid = smack_task_getsid,
3512 .task_getsecid = smack_task_getsecid,
3513 .task_setnice = smack_task_setnice,
3514 .task_setioprio = smack_task_setioprio,
3515 .task_getioprio = smack_task_getioprio,
3516 .task_setscheduler = smack_task_setscheduler,
3517 .task_getscheduler = smack_task_getscheduler,
3518 .task_movememory = smack_task_movememory,
3519 .task_kill = smack_task_kill,
3520 .task_wait = smack_task_wait,
3521 .task_to_inode = smack_task_to_inode,
3523 .ipc_permission = smack_ipc_permission,
3524 .ipc_getsecid = smack_ipc_getsecid,
3526 .msg_msg_alloc_security = smack_msg_msg_alloc_security,
3527 .msg_msg_free_security = smack_msg_msg_free_security,
3529 .msg_queue_alloc_security = smack_msg_queue_alloc_security,
3530 .msg_queue_free_security = smack_msg_queue_free_security,
3531 .msg_queue_associate = smack_msg_queue_associate,
3532 .msg_queue_msgctl = smack_msg_queue_msgctl,
3533 .msg_queue_msgsnd = smack_msg_queue_msgsnd,
3534 .msg_queue_msgrcv = smack_msg_queue_msgrcv,
3536 .shm_alloc_security = smack_shm_alloc_security,
3537 .shm_free_security = smack_shm_free_security,
3538 .shm_associate = smack_shm_associate,
3539 .shm_shmctl = smack_shm_shmctl,
3540 .shm_shmat = smack_shm_shmat,
3542 .sem_alloc_security = smack_sem_alloc_security,
3543 .sem_free_security = smack_sem_free_security,
3544 .sem_associate = smack_sem_associate,
3545 .sem_semctl = smack_sem_semctl,
3546 .sem_semop = smack_sem_semop,
3548 .d_instantiate = smack_d_instantiate,
3550 .getprocattr = smack_getprocattr,
3551 .setprocattr = smack_setprocattr,
3553 .unix_stream_connect = smack_unix_stream_connect,
3554 .unix_may_send = smack_unix_may_send,
3556 .socket_post_create = smack_socket_post_create,
3557 .socket_connect = smack_socket_connect,
3558 .socket_sendmsg = smack_socket_sendmsg,
3559 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
3560 .socket_getpeersec_stream = smack_socket_getpeersec_stream,
3561 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
3562 .sk_alloc_security = smack_sk_alloc_security,
3563 .sk_free_security = smack_sk_free_security,
3564 .sock_graft = smack_sock_graft,
3565 .inet_conn_request = smack_inet_conn_request,
3566 .inet_csk_clone = smack_inet_csk_clone,
3568 /* key management security hooks */
3570 .key_alloc = smack_key_alloc,
3571 .key_free = smack_key_free,
3572 .key_permission = smack_key_permission,
3573 #endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
3577 .audit_rule_init = smack_audit_rule_init,
3578 .audit_rule_known = smack_audit_rule_known,
3579 .audit_rule_match = smack_audit_rule_match,
3580 .audit_rule_free = smack_audit_rule_free,
3581 #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
3583 .secid_to_secctx = smack_secid_to_secctx,
3584 .secctx_to_secid = smack_secctx_to_secid,
3585 .release_secctx = smack_release_secctx,
3586 .inode_notifysecctx = smack_inode_notifysecctx,
3587 .inode_setsecctx = smack_inode_setsecctx,
3588 .inode_getsecctx = smack_inode_getsecctx,
3592 static __init void init_smack_know_list(void)
3594 list_add(&smack_known_huh.list, &smack_known_list);
3595 list_add(&smack_known_hat.list, &smack_known_list);
3596 list_add(&smack_known_star.list, &smack_known_list);
3597 list_add(&smack_known_floor.list, &smack_known_list);
3598 list_add(&smack_known_invalid.list, &smack_known_list);
3599 list_add(&smack_known_web.list, &smack_known_list);
3603 * smack_init - initialize the smack system
3607 static __init int smack_init(void)
3610 struct task_smack *tsp;
3612 if (!security_module_enable(&smack_ops))
3615 tsp = new_task_smack(smack_known_floor.smk_known,
3616 smack_known_floor.smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
3620 printk(KERN_INFO "Smack: Initializing.\n");
3623 * Set the security state for the initial task.
3625 cred = (struct cred *) current->cred;
3626 cred->security = tsp;
3628 /* initialize the smack_know_list */
3629 init_smack_know_list();
3633 spin_lock_init(&smack_known_huh.smk_cipsolock);
3634 spin_lock_init(&smack_known_hat.smk_cipsolock);
3635 spin_lock_init(&smack_known_star.smk_cipsolock);
3636 spin_lock_init(&smack_known_floor.smk_cipsolock);
3637 spin_lock_init(&smack_known_invalid.smk_cipsolock);
3642 if (register_security(&smack_ops))
3643 panic("smack: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
3649 * Smack requires early initialization in order to label
3650 * all processes and objects when they are created.
3652 security_initcall(smack_init);