[PATCH] Fix security check for joint context= and fscontext= mount options
Eric Paris [Fri, 14 Jul 2006 07:24:33 +0000 (00:24 -0700)]
After some discussion on the actual meaning of the filesystem class
security check in try context mount it was determined that the checks for
the context= mount options were not correct if fscontext mount option had
already been used.

When labeling the superblock we should be checking relabel_from and
relabel_to.  But if the superblock has already been labeled (with
fscontext) then context= is actually labeling the inodes, and so we should
be checking relabel_from and associate.  This patch fixes which checks are
called depending on the mount options.

Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

security/selinux/hooks.c

index 2e8b4df..a91c961 100644 (file)
@@ -523,12 +523,16 @@ static int try_context_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
                        goto out_free;
                }
 
-               rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
-               if (rc)
-                       goto out_free;
-
-               if (!fscontext)
+               if (!fscontext) {
+                       rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
+                       if (rc)
+                               goto out_free;
                        sbsec->sid = sid;
+               } else {
+                       rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(sid, sbsec, tsec);
+                       if (rc)
+                               goto out_free;
+               }
                sbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
 
                sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;