ima: rename PATH_CHECK to FILE_CHECK
Mimi Zohar [Tue, 26 Jan 2010 22:02:41 +0000 (17:02 -0500)]
With the movement of the ima hooks functions were renamed from *path* to
*file* since they always deal with struct file.  This patch renames some of
the ima internal flags to make them consistent with the rest of the code.

Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>

Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy
security/integrity/ima/ima.h
security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c

index 6434f0d..6cd6dae 100644 (file)
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ Description:
                        lsm:    [[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=]
                                 [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]]
 
-               base:   func:= [BPRM_CHECK][FILE_MMAP][INODE_PERMISSION]
+               base:   func:= [BPRM_CHECK][FILE_MMAP][FILE_CHECK]
                        mask:= [MAY_READ] [MAY_WRITE] [MAY_APPEND] [MAY_EXEC]
                        fsmagic:= hex value
                        uid:= decimal value
@@ -40,11 +40,11 @@ Description:
 
                        measure func=BPRM_CHECK
                        measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC
-                       measure func=INODE_PERM mask=MAY_READ uid=0
+                       measure func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ uid=0
 
                The default policy measures all executables in bprm_check,
                all files mmapped executable in file_mmap, and all files
-               open for read by root in inode_permission.
+               open for read by root in do_filp_open.
 
                Examples of LSM specific definitions:
 
@@ -54,8 +54,8 @@ Description:
 
                        dont_measure obj_type=var_log_t
                        dont_measure obj_type=auditd_log_t
-                       measure subj_user=system_u func=INODE_PERM mask=MAY_READ
-                       measure subj_role=system_r func=INODE_PERM mask=MAY_READ
+                       measure subj_user=system_u func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ
+                       measure subj_role=system_r func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ
 
                Smack:
-                       measure subj_user=_ func=INODE_PERM mask=MAY_READ
+                       measure subj_user=_ func=FILE_CHECK mask=MAY_READ
index aa25a7e..47fb65d 100644 (file)
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ void iint_free(struct kref *kref);
 void iint_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu);
 
 /* IMA policy related functions */
-enum ima_hooks { PATH_CHECK = 1, FILE_MMAP, BPRM_CHECK };
+enum ima_hooks { FILE_CHECK = 1, FILE_MMAP, BPRM_CHECK };
 
 int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask);
 void ima_init_policy(void);
index 3cd58b6..2a5e0bc 100644 (file)
@@ -95,12 +95,12 @@ err_out:
  * ima_must_measure - measure decision based on policy.
  * @inode: pointer to inode to measure
  * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXECUTE)
- * @function: calling function (PATH_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, FILE_MMAP)
+ * @function: calling function (FILE_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, FILE_MMAP)
  *
  * The policy is defined in terms of keypairs:
  *             subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
  *     subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific.
- *     func: PATH_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | FILE_MMAP
+ *     func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | FILE_MMAP
  *     mask: contains the permission mask
  *     fsmagic: hex value
  *
index b76e1f0..294b005 100644 (file)
@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ void ima_counts_get(struct file *file)
        if (!iint)
                return;
        mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
-       rc = ima_must_measure(iint, inode, MAY_READ, PATH_CHECK);
+       rc = ima_must_measure(iint, inode, MAY_READ, FILE_CHECK);
        if (rc < 0)
                goto out;
 
@@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ int ima_file_check(struct file *file, int mask)
 
        rc = process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name,
                                 mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC),
-                                PATH_CHECK);
+                                FILE_CHECK);
        return 0;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_file_check);
index e127839..4759d0f 100644 (file)
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ static struct ima_measure_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
         .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
        {.action = MEASURE,.func = BPRM_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
         .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
-       {.action = MEASURE,.func = PATH_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = 0,
+       {.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = 0,
         .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID},
 };
 
@@ -282,8 +282,11 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry)
                        break;
                case Opt_func:
                        audit_log_format(ab, "func=%s ", args[0].from);
-                       if (strcmp(args[0].from, "PATH_CHECK") == 0)
-                               entry->func = PATH_CHECK;
+                       if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_CHECK") == 0)
+                               entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
+                       /* PATH_CHECK is for backwards compat */
+                       else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "PATH_CHECK") == 0)
+                               entry->func = FILE_CHECK;
                        else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_MMAP") == 0)
                                entry->func = FILE_MMAP;
                        else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "BPRM_CHECK") == 0)