devcg: propagate local changes down the hierarchy
[linux-3.10.git] / security / security.c
index 7d9426b..7b88c6a 100644 (file)
 #include <linux/integrity.h>
 #include <linux/ima.h>
 #include <linux/evm.h>
+#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/personality.h>
+#include <linux/backing-dev.h>
+#include <net/flow.h>
 
 #define MAX_LSM_EVM_XATTR      2
 
@@ -130,11 +136,23 @@ int __init register_security(struct security_operations *ops)
 
 int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode)
 {
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
+       int rc;
+       rc = yama_ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
+       if (rc)
+               return rc;
+#endif
        return security_ops->ptrace_access_check(child, mode);
 }
 
 int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
 {
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
+       int rc;
+       rc = yama_ptrace_traceme(parent);
+       if (rc)
+               return rc;
+#endif
        return security_ops->ptrace_traceme(parent);
 }
 
@@ -187,25 +205,11 @@ int security_settime(const struct timespec *ts, const struct timezone *tz)
        return security_ops->settime(ts, tz);
 }
 
-int security_vm_enough_memory(long pages)
-{
-       WARN_ON(current->mm == NULL);
-       return security_ops->vm_enough_memory(current->mm, pages);
-}
-
 int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
 {
-       WARN_ON(mm == NULL);
        return security_ops->vm_enough_memory(mm, pages);
 }
 
-int security_vm_enough_memory_kern(long pages)
-{
-       /* If current->mm is a kernel thread then we will pass NULL,
-          for this specific case that is fine */
-       return security_ops->vm_enough_memory(current->mm, pages);
-}
-
 int security_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
        return security_ops->bprm_set_creds(bprm);
@@ -272,8 +276,8 @@ int security_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
        return security_ops->sb_statfs(dentry);
 }
 
-int security_sb_mount(char *dev_name, struct path *path,
-                       char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
+int security_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, struct path *path,
+                       const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data)
 {
        return security_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
 }
@@ -442,7 +446,7 @@ int security_path_chmod(struct path *path, umode_t mode)
        return security_ops->path_chmod(path, mode);
 }
 
-int security_path_chown(struct path *path, uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
+int security_path_chown(struct path *path, kuid_t uid, kgid_t gid)
 {
        if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(path->dentry->d_inode)))
                return 0;
@@ -569,6 +573,9 @@ int security_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
        ret = security_ops->inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
        if (ret)
                return ret;
+       ret = ima_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size);
+       if (ret)
+               return ret;
        return evm_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size);
 }
 
@@ -604,6 +611,9 @@ int security_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
        ret = security_ops->inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
        if (ret)
                return ret;
+       ret = ima_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
+       if (ret)
+               return ret;
        return evm_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
 }
 
@@ -669,18 +679,56 @@ int security_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, unsigned long arg)
        return security_ops->file_ioctl(file, cmd, arg);
 }
 
-int security_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
-                       unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
-                       unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
+static inline unsigned long mmap_prot(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
 {
-       int ret;
+       /*
+        * Does we have PROT_READ and does the application expect
+        * it to imply PROT_EXEC?  If not, nothing to talk about...
+        */
+       if ((prot & (PROT_READ | PROT_EXEC)) != PROT_READ)
+               return prot;
+       if (!(current->personality & READ_IMPLIES_EXEC))
+               return prot;
+       /*
+        * if that's an anonymous mapping, let it.
+        */
+       if (!file)
+               return prot | PROT_EXEC;
+       /*
+        * ditto if it's not on noexec mount, except that on !MMU we need
+        * BDI_CAP_EXEC_MMAP (== VM_MAYEXEC) in this case
+        */
+       if (!(file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOEXEC)) {
+#ifndef CONFIG_MMU
+               unsigned long caps = 0;
+               struct address_space *mapping = file->f_mapping;
+               if (mapping && mapping->backing_dev_info)
+                       caps = mapping->backing_dev_info->capabilities;
+               if (!(caps & BDI_CAP_EXEC_MAP))
+                       return prot;
+#endif
+               return prot | PROT_EXEC;
+       }
+       /* anything on noexec mount won't get PROT_EXEC */
+       return prot;
+}
 
-       ret = security_ops->file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, addr_only);
+int security_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long prot,
+                       unsigned long flags)
+{
+       int ret;
+       ret = security_ops->mmap_file(file, prot,
+                                       mmap_prot(file, prot), flags);
        if (ret)
                return ret;
        return ima_file_mmap(file, prot);
 }
 
+int security_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
+{
+       return security_ops->mmap_addr(addr);
+}
+
 int security_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long reqprot,
                            unsigned long prot)
 {
@@ -713,11 +761,11 @@ int security_file_receive(struct file *file)
        return security_ops->file_receive(file);
 }
 
-int security_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
+int security_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
 {
        int ret;
 
-       ret = security_ops->dentry_open(file, cred);
+       ret = security_ops->file_open(file, cred);
        if (ret)
                return ret;
 
@@ -731,6 +779,9 @@ int security_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
 
 void security_task_free(struct task_struct *task)
 {
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
+       yama_task_free(task);
+#endif
        security_ops->task_free(task);
 }
 
@@ -769,6 +820,16 @@ int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name)
        return security_ops->kernel_module_request(kmod_name);
 }
 
+int security_kernel_module_from_file(struct file *file)
+{
+       int ret;
+
+       ret = security_ops->kernel_module_from_file(file);
+       if (ret)
+               return ret;
+       return ima_module_check(file);
+}
+
 int security_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
                             int flags)
 {
@@ -846,6 +907,12 @@ int security_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
 int security_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3,
                         unsigned long arg4, unsigned long arg5)
 {
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA_STACKED
+       int rc;
+       rc = yama_task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
+       if (rc != -ENOSYS)
+               return rc;
+#endif
        return security_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
 }
 
@@ -1187,24 +1254,42 @@ void security_secmark_refcount_dec(void)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_secmark_refcount_dec);
 
+int security_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security)
+{
+       return security_ops->tun_dev_alloc_security(security);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_alloc_security);
+
+void security_tun_dev_free_security(void *security)
+{
+       security_ops->tun_dev_free_security(security);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_free_security);
+
 int security_tun_dev_create(void)
 {
        return security_ops->tun_dev_create();
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_create);
 
-void security_tun_dev_post_create(struct sock *sk)
+int security_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security)
 {
-       return security_ops->tun_dev_post_create(sk);
+       return security_ops->tun_dev_attach_queue(security);
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_post_create);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach_queue);
 
-int security_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk)
+int security_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security)
 {
-       return security_ops->tun_dev_attach(sk);
+       return security_ops->tun_dev_attach(sk, security);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_attach);
 
+int security_tun_dev_open(void *security)
+{
+       return security_ops->tun_dev_open(security);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_open);
+
 #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM