[PATCH] rock.c: handle corrupted directories
Andrew Morton [Wed, 22 Jun 2005 00:16:50 +0000 (17:16 -0700)]
The bug in rock.c is that it's totally trusting of the contents of the
directories.  If the directory says there's a continuation 10000 bytes into
this 4k block then we cheerily poke around in memory we don't own and oops.

So change rock_continue() to apply various sanity checks, at least ensuring
that the offset+length remain within the bounds for the header part of a
struct rock_ridge directory entry.

Note that the kernel can still overindex the buffer due to the variable size
of the rock-ridge directory entries.  We cannot check that in rock_continue()
unless we go parse the directory entry's signature and work out its size.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>

fs/isofs/rock.c

index 977dd70..9a81830 100644 (file)
@@ -81,9 +81,22 @@ static void init_rock_state(struct rock_state *rs, struct inode *inode)
 static int rock_continue(struct rock_state *rs)
 {
        int ret = 1;
+       int blocksize = 1 << rs->inode->i_blkbits;
+       const int min_de_size = offsetof(struct rock_ridge, u);
 
        kfree(rs->buffer);
        rs->buffer = NULL;
+
+       if ((unsigned)rs->cont_offset > blocksize - min_de_size ||
+           (unsigned)rs->cont_size > blocksize ||
+           (unsigned)(rs->cont_offset + rs->cont_size) > blocksize) {
+               printk(KERN_NOTICE "rock: corrupted directory entry. "
+                       "extent=%d, offset=%d, size=%d\n",
+                       rs->cont_extent, rs->cont_offset, rs->cont_size);
+               ret = -EIO;
+               goto out;
+       }
+
        if (rs->cont_extent) {
                struct buffer_head *bh;