asn1: additional sanity checking during BER decoding
Chris Wright [Wed, 4 Jun 2008 16:16:33 +0000 (09:16 -0700)]
- Don't trust a length which is greater than the working buffer.
  An invalid length could cause overflow when calculating buffer size
  for decoding oid.

- An oid length of zero is invalid and allows for an off-by-one error when
  decoding oid because the first subid actually encodes first 2 subids.

- A primitive encoding may not have an indefinite length.

Thanks to Wei Wang from McAfee for report.

Cc: Steven French <sfrench@us.ibm.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Acked-by: Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>
Signed-off-by: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

fs/cifs/asn1.c
net/ipv4/netfilter/nf_nat_snmp_basic.c

index cb52cbb..f58e41d 100644 (file)
@@ -186,6 +186,11 @@ asn1_length_decode(struct asn1_ctx *ctx, unsigned int *def, unsigned int *len)
                        }
                }
        }
+
+       /* don't trust len bigger than ctx buffer */
+       if (*len > ctx->end - ctx->pointer)
+               return 0;
+
        return 1;
 }
 
@@ -203,6 +208,10 @@ asn1_header_decode(struct asn1_ctx *ctx,
        if (!asn1_length_decode(ctx, &def, &len))
                return 0;
 
+       /* primitive shall be definite, indefinite shall be constructed */
+       if (*con == ASN1_PRI && !def)
+               return 0;
+
        if (def)
                *eoc = ctx->pointer + len;
        else
@@ -389,6 +398,11 @@ asn1_oid_decode(struct asn1_ctx *ctx,
        unsigned long *optr;
 
        size = eoc - ctx->pointer + 1;
+
+       /* first subid actually encodes first two subids */
+       if (size < 2 || size > ULONG_MAX/sizeof(unsigned long))
+               return 0;
+
        *oid = kmalloc(size * sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_ATOMIC);
        if (*oid == NULL)
                return 0;
index 5daefad..7750c97 100644 (file)
@@ -232,6 +232,11 @@ static unsigned char asn1_length_decode(struct asn1_ctx *ctx,
                        }
                }
        }
+
+       /* don't trust len bigger than ctx buffer */
+       if (*len > ctx->end - ctx->pointer)
+               return 0;
+
        return 1;
 }
 
@@ -250,6 +255,10 @@ static unsigned char asn1_header_decode(struct asn1_ctx *ctx,
        if (!asn1_length_decode(ctx, &def, &len))
                return 0;
 
+       /* primitive shall be definite, indefinite shall be constructed */
+       if (*con == ASN1_PRI && !def)
+               return 0;
+
        if (def)
                *eoc = ctx->pointer + len;
        else
@@ -434,6 +443,11 @@ static unsigned char asn1_oid_decode(struct asn1_ctx *ctx,
        unsigned long *optr;
 
        size = eoc - ctx->pointer + 1;
+
+       /* first subid actually encodes first two subids */
+       if (size < 2 || size > ULONG_MAX/sizeof(unsigned long))
+               return 0;
+
        *oid = kmalloc(size * sizeof(unsigned long), GFP_ATOMIC);
        if (*oid == NULL) {
                if (net_ratelimit())