sys_semctl: fix kernel stack leakage
Dan Rosenberg [Thu, 30 Sep 2010 22:15:31 +0000 (15:15 -0700)]
The semctl syscall has several code paths that lead to the leakage of
uninitialized kernel stack memory (namely the IPC_INFO, SEM_INFO,
IPC_STAT, and SEM_STAT commands) during the use of the older, obsolete
version of the semid_ds struct.

The copy_semid_to_user() function declares a semid_ds struct on the stack
and copies it back to the user without initializing or zeroing the
"sem_base", "sem_pending", "sem_pending_last", and "undo" pointers,
allowing the leakage of 16 bytes of kernel stack memory.

The code is still reachable on 32-bit systems - when calling semctl()
newer glibc's automatically OR the IPC command with the IPC_64 flag, but
invoking the syscall directly allows users to use the older versions of
the struct.

Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <dan.j.rosenberg@gmail.com>
Cc: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>

ipc/sem.c

index 40a8f46..0e0d49b 100644 (file)
--- a/ipc/sem.c
+++ b/ipc/sem.c
@@ -743,6 +743,8 @@ static unsigned long copy_semid_to_user(void __user *buf, struct semid64_ds *in,
            {
                struct semid_ds out;
 
+               memset(&out, 0, sizeof(out));
+
                ipc64_perm_to_ipc_perm(&in->sem_perm, &out.sem_perm);
 
                out.sem_otime   = in->sem_otime;