mfd: Fix for the TWL4030 PM sleep/wakeup sequence
[linux-2.6.git] / kernel / cred.c
index d84bdef..5557b55 100644 (file)
 #include <linux/init_task.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
 #include <linux/cn_proc.h>
-#include "cred-internals.h"
 
 #if 0
 #define kdebug(FMT, ...) \
        printk("[%-5.5s%5u] "FMT"\n", current->comm, current->pid ,##__VA_ARGS__)
 #else
-static inline __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)))
-void no_printk(const char *fmt, ...)
-{
-}
 #define kdebug(FMT, ...) \
        no_printk("[%-5.5s%5u] "FMT"\n", current->comm, current->pid ,##__VA_ARGS__)
 #endif
@@ -40,7 +35,7 @@ static struct kmem_cache *cred_jar;
 static struct thread_group_cred init_tgcred = {
        .usage  = ATOMIC_INIT(2),
        .tgid   = 0,
-       .lock   = SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED,
+       .lock   = __SPIN_LOCK_UNLOCKED(init_cred.tgcred.lock),
 };
 #endif
 
@@ -210,6 +205,31 @@ void exit_creds(struct task_struct *tsk)
        }
 }
 
+/**
+ * get_task_cred - Get another task's objective credentials
+ * @task: The task to query
+ *
+ * Get the objective credentials of a task, pinning them so that they can't go
+ * away.  Accessing a task's credentials directly is not permitted.
+ *
+ * The caller must also make sure task doesn't get deleted, either by holding a
+ * ref on task or by holding tasklist_lock to prevent it from being unlinked.
+ */
+const struct cred *get_task_cred(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+       const struct cred *cred;
+
+       rcu_read_lock();
+
+       do {
+               cred = __task_cred((task));
+               BUG_ON(!cred);
+       } while (!atomic_inc_not_zero(&((struct cred *)cred)->usage));
+
+       rcu_read_unlock();
+       return cred;
+}
+
 /*
  * Allocate blank credentials, such that the credentials can be filled in at a
  * later date without risk of ENOMEM.
@@ -232,13 +252,13 @@ struct cred *cred_alloc_blank(void)
 #endif
 
        atomic_set(&new->usage, 1);
+#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
+       new->magic = CRED_MAGIC;
+#endif
 
        if (security_cred_alloc_blank(new, GFP_KERNEL) < 0)
                goto error;
 
-#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
-       new->magic = CRED_MAGIC;
-#endif
        return new;
 
 error:
@@ -305,7 +325,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_creds);
 
 /*
  * Prepare credentials for current to perform an execve()
- * - The caller must hold current->cred_guard_mutex
+ * - The caller must hold ->cred_guard_mutex
  */
 struct cred *prepare_exec_creds(void)
 {
@@ -348,60 +368,6 @@ struct cred *prepare_exec_creds(void)
 }
 
 /*
- * prepare new credentials for the usermode helper dispatcher
- */
-struct cred *prepare_usermodehelper_creds(void)
-{
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
-       struct thread_group_cred *tgcred = NULL;
-#endif
-       struct cred *new;
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
-       tgcred = kzalloc(sizeof(*new->tgcred), GFP_ATOMIC);
-       if (!tgcred)
-               return NULL;
-#endif
-
-       new = kmem_cache_alloc(cred_jar, GFP_ATOMIC);
-       if (!new)
-               return NULL;
-
-       kdebug("prepare_usermodehelper_creds() alloc %p", new);
-
-       memcpy(new, &init_cred, sizeof(struct cred));
-
-       atomic_set(&new->usage, 1);
-       set_cred_subscribers(new, 0);
-       get_group_info(new->group_info);
-       get_uid(new->user);
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
-       new->thread_keyring = NULL;
-       new->request_key_auth = NULL;
-       new->jit_keyring = KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_DEFAULT;
-
-       atomic_set(&tgcred->usage, 1);
-       spin_lock_init(&tgcred->lock);
-       new->tgcred = tgcred;
-#endif
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
-       new->security = NULL;
-#endif
-       if (security_prepare_creds(new, &init_cred, GFP_ATOMIC) < 0)
-               goto error;
-       validate_creds(new);
-
-       BUG_ON(atomic_read(&new->usage) != 1);
-       return new;
-
-error:
-       put_cred(new);
-       return NULL;
-}
-
-/*
  * Copy credentials for the new process created by fork()
  *
  * We share if we can, but under some circumstances we have to generate a new
@@ -418,8 +384,6 @@ int copy_creds(struct task_struct *p, unsigned long clone_flags)
        struct cred *new;
        int ret;
 
-       mutex_init(&p->cred_guard_mutex);
-
        if (
 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
                !p->cred->thread_keyring &&
@@ -517,8 +481,6 @@ int commit_creds(struct cred *new)
 #endif
        BUG_ON(atomic_read(&new->usage) < 1);
 
-       security_commit_creds(new, old);
-
        get_cred(new); /* we will require a ref for the subj creds too */
 
        /* dumpability changes */
@@ -554,8 +516,6 @@ int commit_creds(struct cred *new)
                atomic_dec(&old->user->processes);
        alter_cred_subscribers(old, -2);
 
-       sched_switch_user(task);
-
        /* send notifications */
        if (new->uid   != old->uid  ||
            new->euid  != old->euid ||
@@ -697,6 +657,8 @@ struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *daemon)
        validate_creds(old);
 
        *new = *old;
+       atomic_set(&new->usage, 1);
+       set_cred_subscribers(new, 0);
        get_uid(new->user);
        get_group_info(new->group_info);
 
@@ -714,8 +676,6 @@ struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *daemon)
        if (security_prepare_creds(new, old, GFP_KERNEL) < 0)
                goto error;
 
-       atomic_set(&new->usage, 1);
-       set_cred_subscribers(new, 0);
        put_cred(old);
        validate_creds(new);
        return new;
@@ -781,16 +741,24 @@ int set_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_create_files_as);
 
+struct user_namespace *current_user_ns(void)
+{
+       return _current_user_ns();
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(current_user_ns);
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS
 
 bool creds_are_invalid(const struct cred *cred)
 {
        if (cred->magic != CRED_MAGIC)
                return true;
-       if (atomic_read(&cred->usage) < atomic_read(&cred->subscribers))
-               return true;
 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
-       if (selinux_is_enabled()) {
+       /*
+        * cred->security == NULL if security_cred_alloc_blank() or
+        * security_prepare_creds() returned an error.
+        */
+       if (selinux_is_enabled() && cred->security) {
                if ((unsigned long) cred->security < PAGE_SIZE)
                        return true;
                if ((*(u32 *)cred->security & 0xffffff00) ==