#include <linux/time.h>
#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
#include <linux/stat.h>
+#include <linux/task_io_accounting_ops.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/capability.h>
#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/fdtable.h>
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <linux/namei.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/tracehook.h>
#include <linux/cgroup.h>
#include <linux/cpuset.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
NULL, &proc_single_file_operations, \
{ .proc_show = &proc_##OTYPE } )
-int maps_protect;
-EXPORT_SYMBOL(maps_protect);
+/*
+ * Count the number of hardlinks for the pid_entry table, excluding the .
+ * and .. links.
+ */
+static unsigned int pid_entry_count_dirs(const struct pid_entry *entries,
+ unsigned int n)
+{
+ unsigned int i;
+ unsigned int count;
+
+ count = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
+ if (S_ISDIR(entries[i].mode))
+ ++count;
+ }
+
+ return count;
+}
static struct fs_struct *get_fs_struct(struct task_struct *task)
{
static int get_nr_threads(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
- /* Must be called with the rcu_read_lock held */
unsigned long flags;
int count = 0;
return result;
}
-#define MAY_PTRACE(task) \
- (task == current || \
- (task->parent == current && \
- (task->ptrace & PT_PTRACED) && \
- (task_is_stopped_or_traced(task)) && \
- security_ptrace(current,task) == 0))
+/*
+ * Return zero if current may access user memory in @task, -error if not.
+ */
+static int check_mem_permission(struct task_struct *task)
+{
+ /*
+ * A task can always look at itself, in case it chooses
+ * to use system calls instead of load instructions.
+ */
+ if (task == current)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * If current is actively ptrace'ing, and would also be
+ * permitted to freshly attach with ptrace now, permit it.
+ */
+ if (task_is_stopped_or_traced(task)) {
+ int match;
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ match = (tracehook_tracer_task(task) == current);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ if (match && ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH))
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Noone else is allowed.
+ */
+ return -EPERM;
+}
struct mm_struct *mm_for_maps(struct task_struct *task)
{
task_lock(task);
if (task->mm != mm)
goto out;
- if (task->mm != current->mm && __ptrace_may_attach(task) < 0)
+ if (task->mm != current->mm &&
+ __ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ) < 0)
goto out;
task_unlock(task);
return mm;
static int proc_pid_schedstat(struct task_struct *task, char *buffer)
{
return sprintf(buffer, "%llu %llu %lu\n",
- task->sched_info.cpu_time,
+ task->se.sum_exec_runtime,
task->sched_info.run_delay,
task->sched_info.pcount);
}
static int lstats_show_proc(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
{
int i;
- struct task_struct *task = m->private;
- seq_puts(m, "Latency Top version : v0.1\n");
+ struct inode *inode = m->private;
+ struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode);
+ if (!task)
+ return -ESRCH;
+ seq_puts(m, "Latency Top version : v0.1\n");
for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) {
if (task->latency_record[i].backtrace[0]) {
int q;
task->latency_record[i].time,
task->latency_record[i].max);
for (q = 0; q < LT_BACKTRACEDEPTH; q++) {
- char sym[KSYM_NAME_LEN];
+ char sym[KSYM_SYMBOL_LEN];
char *c;
if (!task->latency_record[i].backtrace[q])
break;
}
}
+ put_task_struct(task);
return 0;
}
static int lstats_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
- int ret;
- struct seq_file *m;
- struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode);
-
- if (!task)
- return -ENOENT;
- ret = single_open(file, lstats_show_proc, NULL);
- if (!ret) {
- m = file->private_data;
- m->private = task;
- }
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int lstats_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
-{
- struct seq_file *m = file->private_data;
- struct task_struct *task = m->private;
-
- put_task_struct(task);
- return single_release(inode, file);
+ return single_open(file, lstats_show_proc, inode);
}
static ssize_t lstats_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *offs)
{
- struct seq_file *m;
- struct task_struct *task;
+ struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(file->f_dentry->d_inode);
- m = file->private_data;
- task = m->private;
+ if (!task)
+ return -ESRCH;
clear_all_latency_tracing(task);
+ put_task_struct(task);
return count;
}
.read = seq_read,
.write = lstats_write,
.llseek = seq_lseek,
- .release = lstats_release,
+ .release = single_release,
};
#endif
struct rlimit rlim[RLIM_NLIMITS];
- rcu_read_lock();
- if (!lock_task_sighand(task,&flags)) {
- rcu_read_unlock();
+ if (!lock_task_sighand(task, &flags))
return 0;
- }
memcpy(rlim, task->signal->rlim, sizeof(struct rlimit) * RLIM_NLIMITS);
unlock_task_sighand(task, &flags);
- rcu_read_unlock();
/*
* print the file header
return count;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK
+static int proc_pid_syscall(struct task_struct *task, char *buffer)
+{
+ long nr;
+ unsigned long args[6], sp, pc;
+
+ if (task_current_syscall(task, &nr, args, 6, &sp, &pc))
+ return sprintf(buffer, "running\n");
+
+ if (nr < 0)
+ return sprintf(buffer, "%ld 0x%lx 0x%lx\n", nr, sp, pc);
+
+ return sprintf(buffer,
+ "%ld 0x%lx 0x%lx 0x%lx 0x%lx 0x%lx 0x%lx 0x%lx 0x%lx\n",
+ nr,
+ args[0], args[1], args[2], args[3], args[4], args[5],
+ sp, pc);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK */
+
/************************************************************************/
/* Here the fs part begins */
/************************************************************************/
*/
task = get_proc_task(inode);
if (task) {
- allowed = ptrace_may_attach(task);
+ allowed = ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ);
put_task_struct(task);
}
return allowed;
.setattr = proc_setattr,
};
-extern const struct seq_operations mounts_op;
-struct proc_mounts {
- struct seq_file m;
- int event;
-};
-
-static int mounts_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+static int mounts_open_common(struct inode *inode, struct file *file,
+ const struct seq_operations *op)
{
struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode);
struct nsproxy *nsp;
struct mnt_namespace *ns = NULL;
+ struct fs_struct *fs = NULL;
+ struct path root;
struct proc_mounts *p;
int ret = -EINVAL;
get_mnt_ns(ns);
}
rcu_read_unlock();
-
+ if (ns)
+ fs = get_fs_struct(task);
put_task_struct(task);
}
- if (ns) {
- ret = -ENOMEM;
- p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct proc_mounts), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (p) {
- file->private_data = &p->m;
- ret = seq_open(file, &mounts_op);
- if (!ret) {
- p->m.private = ns;
- p->event = ns->event;
- return 0;
- }
- kfree(p);
- }
- put_mnt_ns(ns);
- }
+ if (!ns)
+ goto err;
+ if (!fs)
+ goto err_put_ns;
+
+ read_lock(&fs->lock);
+ root = fs->root;
+ path_get(&root);
+ read_unlock(&fs->lock);
+ put_fs_struct(fs);
+
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
+ p = kmalloc(sizeof(struct proc_mounts), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!p)
+ goto err_put_path;
+
+ file->private_data = &p->m;
+ ret = seq_open(file, op);
+ if (ret)
+ goto err_free;
+
+ p->m.private = p;
+ p->ns = ns;
+ p->root = root;
+ p->event = ns->event;
+
+ return 0;
+
+ err_free:
+ kfree(p);
+ err_put_path:
+ path_put(&root);
+ err_put_ns:
+ put_mnt_ns(ns);
+ err:
return ret;
}
static int mounts_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
- struct seq_file *m = file->private_data;
- struct mnt_namespace *ns = m->private;
- put_mnt_ns(ns);
+ struct proc_mounts *p = file->private_data;
+ path_put(&p->root);
+ put_mnt_ns(p->ns);
return seq_release(inode, file);
}
static unsigned mounts_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait)
{
struct proc_mounts *p = file->private_data;
- struct mnt_namespace *ns = p->m.private;
+ struct mnt_namespace *ns = p->ns;
unsigned res = 0;
poll_wait(file, &ns->poll, wait);
return res;
}
+static int mounts_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ return mounts_open_common(inode, file, &mounts_op);
+}
+
static const struct file_operations proc_mounts_operations = {
.open = mounts_open,
.read = seq_read,
.poll = mounts_poll,
};
-extern const struct seq_operations mountstats_op;
-static int mountstats_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+static int mountinfo_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
- int ret = seq_open(file, &mountstats_op);
-
- if (!ret) {
- struct seq_file *m = file->private_data;
- struct nsproxy *nsp;
- struct mnt_namespace *mnt_ns = NULL;
- struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode);
-
- if (task) {
- rcu_read_lock();
- nsp = task_nsproxy(task);
- if (nsp) {
- mnt_ns = nsp->mnt_ns;
- if (mnt_ns)
- get_mnt_ns(mnt_ns);
- }
- rcu_read_unlock();
+ return mounts_open_common(inode, file, &mountinfo_op);
+}
- put_task_struct(task);
- }
+static const struct file_operations proc_mountinfo_operations = {
+ .open = mountinfo_open,
+ .read = seq_read,
+ .llseek = seq_lseek,
+ .release = mounts_release,
+ .poll = mounts_poll,
+};
- if (mnt_ns)
- m->private = mnt_ns;
- else {
- seq_release(inode, file);
- ret = -EINVAL;
- }
- }
- return ret;
+static int mountstats_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ return mounts_open_common(inode, file, &mountstats_op);
}
static const struct file_operations proc_mountstats_operations = {
if (!task)
goto out_no_task;
- if (!MAY_PTRACE(task) || !ptrace_may_attach(task))
+ if (check_mem_permission(task))
goto out;
ret = -ENOMEM;
this_len = (count > PAGE_SIZE) ? PAGE_SIZE : count;
retval = access_process_vm(task, src, page, this_len, 0);
- if (!retval || !MAY_PTRACE(task) || !ptrace_may_attach(task)) {
+ if (!retval || check_mem_permission(task)) {
if (!ret)
ret = -EIO;
break;
if (!task)
goto out_no_task;
- if (!MAY_PTRACE(task) || !ptrace_may_attach(task))
+ if (check_mem_permission(task))
goto out;
copied = -ENOMEM;
if (!task)
goto out_no_task;
- if (!ptrace_may_attach(task))
+ if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ))
goto out;
ret = -ENOMEM;
.read = proc_loginuid_read,
.write = proc_loginuid_write,
};
+
+static ssize_t proc_sessionid_read(struct file * file, char __user * buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct inode * inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
+ struct task_struct *task = get_proc_task(inode);
+ ssize_t length;
+ char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
+
+ if (!task)
+ return -ESRCH;
+ length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%u",
+ audit_get_sessionid(task));
+ put_task_struct(task);
+ return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, length);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations proc_sessionid_operations = {
+ .read = proc_sessionid_read,
+};
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION
#endif
+/*
+ * We added or removed a vma mapping the executable. The vmas are only mapped
+ * during exec and are not mapped with the mmap system call.
+ * Callers must hold down_write() on the mm's mmap_sem for these
+ */
+void added_exe_file_vma(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+ mm->num_exe_file_vmas++;
+}
+
+void removed_exe_file_vma(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+ mm->num_exe_file_vmas--;
+ if ((mm->num_exe_file_vmas == 0) && mm->exe_file){
+ fput(mm->exe_file);
+ mm->exe_file = NULL;
+ }
+
+}
+
+void set_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm, struct file *new_exe_file)
+{
+ if (new_exe_file)
+ get_file(new_exe_file);
+ if (mm->exe_file)
+ fput(mm->exe_file);
+ mm->exe_file = new_exe_file;
+ mm->num_exe_file_vmas = 0;
+}
+
+struct file *get_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+ struct file *exe_file;
+
+ /* We need mmap_sem to protect against races with removal of
+ * VM_EXECUTABLE vmas */
+ down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ exe_file = mm->exe_file;
+ if (exe_file)
+ get_file(exe_file);
+ up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ return exe_file;
+}
+
+void dup_mm_exe_file(struct mm_struct *oldmm, struct mm_struct *newmm)
+{
+ /* It's safe to write the exe_file pointer without exe_file_lock because
+ * this is called during fork when the task is not yet in /proc */
+ newmm->exe_file = get_mm_exe_file(oldmm);
+}
+
+static int proc_exe_link(struct inode *inode, struct path *exe_path)
+{
+ struct task_struct *task;
+ struct mm_struct *mm;
+ struct file *exe_file;
+
+ task = get_proc_task(inode);
+ if (!task)
+ return -ENOENT;
+ mm = get_task_mm(task);
+ put_task_struct(task);
+ if (!mm)
+ return -ENOENT;
+ exe_file = get_mm_exe_file(mm);
+ mmput(mm);
+ if (exe_file) {
+ *exe_path = exe_file->f_path;
+ path_get(&exe_file->f_path);
+ fput(exe_file);
+ return 0;
+ } else
+ return -ENOENT;
+}
+
static void *proc_pid_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd)
{
struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
file = fcheck_files(files, fd);
if (!file)
goto out_unlock;
- if (file->f_mode & 1)
+ if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
inode->i_mode |= S_IRUSR | S_IXUSR;
- if (file->f_mode & 2)
+ if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
inode->i_mode |= S_IWUSR | S_IXUSR;
spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
put_files_struct(files);
unsigned int fd, ino;
int retval;
struct files_struct * files;
- struct fdtable *fdt;
retval = -ENOENT;
if (!p)
if (!files)
goto out;
rcu_read_lock();
- fdt = files_fdtable(files);
for (fd = filp->f_pos-2;
- fd < fdt->max_fds;
+ fd < files_fdtable(files)->max_fds;
fd++, filp->f_pos++) {
char name[PROC_NUMBUF];
int len;
* /proc/pid/fd needs a special permission handler so that a process can still
* access /proc/self/fd after it has executed a setuid().
*/
-static int proc_fd_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask,
- struct nameidata *nd)
+static int proc_fd_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
{
int rv;
}
#ifdef CONFIG_TASK_IO_ACCOUNTING
-static int proc_pid_io_accounting(struct task_struct *task, char *buffer)
+static int do_io_accounting(struct task_struct *task, char *buffer, int whole)
{
+ struct task_io_accounting acct = task->ioac;
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ if (whole && lock_task_sighand(task, &flags)) {
+ struct task_struct *t = task;
+
+ task_io_accounting_add(&acct, &task->signal->ioac);
+ while_each_thread(task, t)
+ task_io_accounting_add(&acct, &t->ioac);
+
+ unlock_task_sighand(task, &flags);
+ }
return sprintf(buffer,
-#ifdef CONFIG_TASK_XACCT
"rchar: %llu\n"
"wchar: %llu\n"
"syscr: %llu\n"
"syscw: %llu\n"
-#endif
"read_bytes: %llu\n"
"write_bytes: %llu\n"
"cancelled_write_bytes: %llu\n",
-#ifdef CONFIG_TASK_XACCT
- (unsigned long long)task->rchar,
- (unsigned long long)task->wchar,
- (unsigned long long)task->syscr,
- (unsigned long long)task->syscw,
-#endif
- (unsigned long long)task->ioac.read_bytes,
- (unsigned long long)task->ioac.write_bytes,
- (unsigned long long)task->ioac.cancelled_write_bytes);
+ (unsigned long long)acct.rchar,
+ (unsigned long long)acct.wchar,
+ (unsigned long long)acct.syscr,
+ (unsigned long long)acct.syscw,
+ (unsigned long long)acct.read_bytes,
+ (unsigned long long)acct.write_bytes,
+ (unsigned long long)acct.cancelled_write_bytes);
+}
+
+static int proc_tid_io_accounting(struct task_struct *task, char *buffer)
+{
+ return do_io_accounting(task, buffer, 0);
+}
+
+static int proc_tgid_io_accounting(struct task_struct *task, char *buffer)
+{
+ return do_io_accounting(task, buffer, 1);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_TASK_IO_ACCOUNTING */
+
+static int proc_pid_personality(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
+ struct pid *pid, struct task_struct *task)
+{
+ seq_printf(m, "%08x\n", task->personality);
+ return 0;
}
-#endif
/*
* Thread groups
DIR("task", S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO, task),
DIR("fd", S_IRUSR|S_IXUSR, fd),
DIR("fdinfo", S_IRUSR|S_IXUSR, fdinfo),
+#ifdef CONFIG_NET
+ DIR("net", S_IRUGO|S_IXUGO, net),
+#endif
REG("environ", S_IRUSR, environ),
INF("auxv", S_IRUSR, pid_auxv),
ONE("status", S_IRUGO, pid_status),
+ ONE("personality", S_IRUSR, pid_personality),
INF("limits", S_IRUSR, pid_limits),
#ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_DEBUG
REG("sched", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, pid_sched),
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK
+ INF("syscall", S_IRUSR, pid_syscall),
#endif
INF("cmdline", S_IRUGO, pid_cmdline),
ONE("stat", S_IRUGO, tgid_stat),
LNK("root", root),
LNK("exe", exe),
REG("mounts", S_IRUGO, mounts),
+ REG("mountinfo", S_IRUGO, mountinfo),
REG("mountstats", S_IRUSR, mountstats),
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_PAGE_MONITOR
REG("clear_refs", S_IWUSR, clear_refs),
REG("oom_adj", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, oom_adjust),
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
REG("loginuid", S_IWUSR|S_IRUGO, loginuid),
+ REG("sessionid", S_IRUGO, sessionid),
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION
REG("make-it-fail", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, fault_inject),
REG("coredump_filter", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, coredump_filter),
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_TASK_IO_ACCOUNTING
- INF("io", S_IRUGO, pid_io_accounting),
+ INF("io", S_IRUGO, tgid_io_accounting),
#endif
};
inode->i_op = &proc_tgid_base_inode_operations;
inode->i_fop = &proc_tgid_base_operations;
inode->i_flags|=S_IMMUTABLE;
- inode->i_nlink = 5;
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
- inode->i_nlink += 1;
-#endif
+
+ inode->i_nlink = 2 + pid_entry_count_dirs(tgid_base_stuff,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(tgid_base_stuff));
dentry->d_op = &pid_dentry_operations;
REG("environ", S_IRUSR, environ),
INF("auxv", S_IRUSR, pid_auxv),
ONE("status", S_IRUGO, pid_status),
+ ONE("personality", S_IRUSR, pid_personality),
INF("limits", S_IRUSR, pid_limits),
#ifdef CONFIG_SCHED_DEBUG
REG("sched", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, pid_sched),
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK
+ INF("syscall", S_IRUSR, pid_syscall),
#endif
INF("cmdline", S_IRUGO, pid_cmdline),
ONE("stat", S_IRUGO, tid_stat),
LNK("root", root),
LNK("exe", exe),
REG("mounts", S_IRUGO, mounts),
+ REG("mountinfo", S_IRUGO, mountinfo),
#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_PAGE_MONITOR
REG("clear_refs", S_IWUSR, clear_refs),
REG("smaps", S_IRUGO, smaps),
REG("oom_adj", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, oom_adjust),
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
REG("loginuid", S_IWUSR|S_IRUGO, loginuid),
+ REG("sessionid", S_IRUSR, sessionid),
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION
REG("make-it-fail", S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR, fault_inject),
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_TASK_IO_ACCOUNTING
+ INF("io", S_IRUGO, tid_io_accounting),
+#endif
};
static int proc_tid_base_readdir(struct file * filp,
inode->i_op = &proc_tid_base_inode_operations;
inode->i_fop = &proc_tid_base_operations;
inode->i_flags|=S_IMMUTABLE;
- inode->i_nlink = 4;
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
- inode->i_nlink += 1;
-#endif
+
+ inode->i_nlink = 2 + pid_entry_count_dirs(tid_base_stuff,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(tid_base_stuff));
dentry->d_op = &pid_dentry_operations;
generic_fillattr(inode, stat);
if (p) {
- rcu_read_lock();
stat->nlink += get_nr_threads(p);
- rcu_read_unlock();
put_task_struct(p);
}
Code Review / linux-2.6.git / blobdiff