2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
27 #include <linux/kernel.h>
28 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
29 #include <linux/errno.h>
30 #include <linux/sched.h>
31 #include <linux/security.h>
32 #include <linux/xattr.h>
33 #include <linux/capability.h>
34 #include <linux/unistd.h>
36 #include <linux/mman.h>
37 #include <linux/slab.h>
38 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
39 #include <linux/swap.h>
40 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
41 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
42 #include <linux/file.h>
43 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
44 #include <linux/namei.h>
45 #include <linux/mount.h>
46 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
49 #include <linux/tty.h>
51 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
52 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
53 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
54 #include <net/netlabel.h>
55 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
56 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
57 #include <asm/atomic.h>
58 #include <linux/bitops.h>
59 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
60 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
62 #include <linux/tcp.h>
63 #include <linux/udp.h>
64 #include <linux/dccp.h>
65 #include <linux/quota.h>
66 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
67 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
68 #include <linux/parser.h>
69 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
71 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
72 #include <linux/personality.h>
73 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
74 #include <linux/audit.h>
75 #include <linux/string.h>
76 #include <linux/selinux.h>
77 #include <linux/mutex.h>
78 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
89 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
90 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
92 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
94 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
95 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
96 extern int selinux_compat_net;
97 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
99 /* SECMARK reference count */
100 atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
102 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
103 int selinux_enforcing;
105 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
107 unsigned long enforcing;
108 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
109 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
112 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
115 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
116 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
118 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
120 unsigned long enabled;
121 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
122 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
125 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
127 int selinux_enabled = 1;
132 * Minimal support for a secondary security module,
133 * just to allow the use of the capability module.
135 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops;
137 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
138 before the policy was loaded. */
139 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
140 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
142 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
145 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
148 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
149 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
150 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
151 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
154 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
156 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
160 * initialise the security for the init task
162 static void cred_init_security(void)
164 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
165 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
167 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
169 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
171 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
172 cred->security = tsec;
176 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
178 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
180 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
182 tsec = cred->security;
187 * get the objective security ID of a task
189 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
194 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
200 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
202 static inline u32 current_sid(void)
204 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_cred()->security;
209 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
211 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
213 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
214 u32 sid = current_sid();
216 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
220 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
221 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
223 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
224 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
225 isec->task_sid = sid;
226 inode->i_security = isec;
231 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
233 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
234 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
236 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
237 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
238 list_del_init(&isec->list);
239 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
241 inode->i_security = NULL;
242 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
245 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
247 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
248 u32 sid = current_sid();
250 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
255 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
256 file->f_security = fsec;
261 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
263 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
264 file->f_security = NULL;
268 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
270 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
272 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
276 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
277 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
278 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
279 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
281 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
282 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
283 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
284 sb->s_security = sbsec;
289 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
291 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
293 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
294 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
295 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
296 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
298 sb->s_security = NULL;
302 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
304 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
306 ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
310 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
311 ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
312 sk->sk_security = ssec;
314 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec, family);
319 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
321 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
323 sk->sk_security = NULL;
324 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(ssec);
328 /* The security server must be initialized before
329 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
330 extern int ss_initialized;
332 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
334 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
336 "uses transition SIDs",
338 "uses genfs_contexts",
339 "not configured for labeling",
340 "uses mountpoint labeling",
343 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
345 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
347 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
356 Opt_labelsupport = 5,
359 static const match_table_t tokens = {
360 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
361 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
362 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
363 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
364 {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
368 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
370 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
371 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
372 const struct cred *cred)
374 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
377 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
378 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
382 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
383 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
387 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
388 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
389 const struct cred *cred)
391 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
393 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
394 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
398 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
399 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
403 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
405 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
406 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
407 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
410 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
411 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
412 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
413 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
414 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
415 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
416 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
417 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
418 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
422 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
423 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
424 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
425 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
426 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
427 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
429 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
430 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
431 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
436 sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP);
438 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
439 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
440 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
442 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
443 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
444 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
446 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS ||
447 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT ||
448 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE ||
449 sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
450 sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP;
452 /* Initialize the root inode. */
453 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
455 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
456 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
457 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
459 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
461 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
462 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
463 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
464 struct inode_security_struct, list);
465 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
466 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
467 inode = igrab(inode);
469 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
473 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
474 list_del_init(&isec->list);
477 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
483 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
484 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
485 * mount options, or whatever.
487 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
488 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
491 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
492 char *context = NULL;
496 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
498 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
504 tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
505 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
506 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
508 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
511 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
512 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)
513 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
515 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
516 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
521 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
522 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
528 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
529 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
532 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
533 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
535 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
536 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
539 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
540 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
542 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
543 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
546 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
547 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
549 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
550 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
551 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
553 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
556 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
557 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
559 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) {
560 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
561 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP;
564 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
569 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
573 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
574 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
576 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
578 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
579 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
580 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
581 (old_sid != new_sid))
584 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
585 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
587 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
588 if (mnt_flags & flag)
594 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
595 * labeling information.
597 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
598 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
600 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
602 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
603 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
604 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
605 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
606 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
607 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
608 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
609 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
610 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
612 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
614 if (!ss_initialized) {
616 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
617 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
618 server is ready to handle calls. */
619 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
620 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
621 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
622 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
626 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
627 "before the security server is initialized\n");
632 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
633 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
634 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
635 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
637 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
638 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
639 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
640 * will be used for both mounts)
642 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
647 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
648 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
649 * than once with different security options.
651 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
654 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
656 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
657 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
659 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
660 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
661 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
668 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
670 goto out_double_mount;
672 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
677 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
679 goto out_double_mount;
681 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
683 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
684 rootcontext_sid = sid;
686 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
688 goto out_double_mount;
690 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
694 defcontext_sid = sid;
696 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
698 goto out_double_mount;
700 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
709 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
710 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
711 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
712 goto out_double_mount;
717 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
718 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
720 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
721 rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
723 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
724 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
728 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
730 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
734 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
738 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
739 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
740 * the superblock context if not already set.
743 if (!fscontext_sid) {
744 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
748 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
750 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
755 if (!rootcontext_sid)
756 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
758 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
759 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
762 if (rootcontext_sid) {
763 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
768 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
769 root_isec->initialized = 1;
772 if (defcontext_sid) {
773 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
775 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
776 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
780 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
781 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
787 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
790 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
792 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
796 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
797 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
801 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
802 struct super_block *newsb)
804 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
805 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
807 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
808 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
809 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
812 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
813 * mount options. thus we can safely put this sb on the list and deal
816 if (!ss_initialized) {
817 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
818 if (list_empty(&newsbsec->list))
819 list_add(&newsbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
820 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
824 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
825 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
827 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
828 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
831 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
833 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
835 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
836 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
837 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
840 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
844 if (!set_rootcontext) {
845 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
846 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
849 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
851 if (set_rootcontext) {
852 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
853 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
854 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
855 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
857 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
860 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
861 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
864 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
865 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
868 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
869 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
870 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
872 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
874 /* Standard string-based options. */
875 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
877 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
882 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
886 if (context || defcontext) {
888 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
891 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
901 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
904 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
911 case Opt_rootcontext:
914 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
917 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
925 if (context || defcontext) {
927 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
930 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
936 case Opt_labelsupport:
940 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
947 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
951 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
952 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
953 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
958 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
959 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
962 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
963 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
966 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
967 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
970 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
971 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
974 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
985 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
987 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
990 char *options = data;
991 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
993 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
998 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
1000 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
1005 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1008 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1012 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
1013 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
1018 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
1021 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
1022 has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
1026 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
1028 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
1031 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
1033 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
1034 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
1036 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
1037 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
1039 case SE_SBLABELSUPP:
1041 seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
1046 /* we need a comma before each option */
1048 seq_puts(m, prefix);
1051 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
1057 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1059 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1062 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1064 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1070 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1072 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1077 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1079 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1081 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1083 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1085 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1087 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1089 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1091 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1093 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1097 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1100 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1102 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1105 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1107 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1110 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1116 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1117 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1119 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1126 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1127 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1129 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1131 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1132 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1134 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1136 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1138 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1144 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1145 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1146 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1147 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1148 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1150 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1152 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1153 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1154 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1156 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1157 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1158 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1159 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1160 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1161 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1162 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1164 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1167 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1169 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1171 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1174 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1177 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1178 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1183 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1185 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1190 end = buffer+buflen;
1195 while (de && de != de->parent) {
1196 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
1200 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
1205 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1206 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1210 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1218 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1219 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1221 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1222 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1224 struct dentry *dentry;
1225 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1226 char *context = NULL;
1230 if (isec->initialized)
1233 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1234 if (isec->initialized)
1237 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1238 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1239 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1240 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1241 server is ready to handle calls. */
1242 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1243 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1244 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1245 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1249 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1250 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1251 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1252 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1256 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1257 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1259 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1260 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1262 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1263 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1266 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: no dentry for dev=%s "
1267 "ino=%ld\n", __func__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
1272 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1273 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1279 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1281 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1282 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1283 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1291 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1297 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1303 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1304 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1305 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1306 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1310 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1311 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1314 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1318 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1319 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1320 __func__, context, -rc,
1321 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1323 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1331 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1332 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1334 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1335 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1336 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1338 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1339 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1340 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
1348 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1349 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1352 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1353 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1355 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1356 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
1358 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1359 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
1370 isec->initialized = 1;
1373 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1375 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1376 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1380 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1381 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1387 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1388 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1391 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1392 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1395 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1396 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1399 /* All other signals. */
1400 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1408 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1409 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1411 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1412 const struct cred *target,
1415 u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1417 return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1421 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1422 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1423 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1424 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1426 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1427 const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1430 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1434 __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1435 __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1437 return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1441 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1442 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1443 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1444 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1446 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1451 sid = current_sid();
1452 tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1453 return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1456 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1457 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1460 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1461 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1462 const struct cred *cred,
1465 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1466 struct av_decision avd;
1468 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1469 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1472 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1476 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1478 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1481 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1485 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1489 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1490 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT)
1491 avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1495 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1496 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1499 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1501 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1502 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1505 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1506 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1507 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1508 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1509 struct inode *inode,
1511 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
1513 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1514 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1517 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1520 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1521 isec = inode->i_security;
1525 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1526 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1529 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1532 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1533 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1534 pathname if needed. */
1535 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1536 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1537 struct dentry *dentry,
1540 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1541 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1543 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1544 ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
1545 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1546 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1549 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1550 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1551 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1552 check a particular permission to the file.
1553 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1554 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1555 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1556 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1557 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1561 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1562 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1563 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1564 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1567 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1568 ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
1570 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1571 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1579 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1582 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1588 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1589 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1590 struct dentry *dentry,
1593 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1594 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
1595 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1596 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1598 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1601 dsec = dir->i_security;
1602 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1605 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1607 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1608 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1610 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1611 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1616 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
1617 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, &newsid);
1622 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1626 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1627 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1628 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1631 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1632 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1633 struct task_struct *ctx)
1635 u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1637 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1641 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1644 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1645 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1646 struct dentry *dentry,
1650 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1651 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1652 u32 sid = current_sid();
1656 dsec = dir->i_security;
1657 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1659 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1660 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1663 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1664 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1679 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1684 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1688 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1689 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1690 struct inode *new_dir,
1691 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1693 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1694 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1695 u32 sid = current_sid();
1697 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1700 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1701 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1702 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1703 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1705 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1707 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
1708 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1709 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1712 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1713 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1716 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1717 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1718 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1723 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry;
1724 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1725 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1726 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1727 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1730 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1731 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1732 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1733 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1735 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1743 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1744 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1745 struct super_block *sb,
1747 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1749 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1750 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1752 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1753 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1756 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1757 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1761 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1762 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1763 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1764 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1767 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1769 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1773 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1775 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1777 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1784 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1785 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1789 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1791 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1792 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1799 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1808 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1811 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1813 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1815 if (selinux_policycap_openperm) {
1816 mode_t mode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode;
1818 * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
1822 else if (S_ISCHR(mode))
1823 av |= CHR_FILE__OPEN;
1824 else if (S_ISBLK(mode))
1825 av |= BLK_FILE__OPEN;
1826 else if (S_ISFIFO(mode))
1827 av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
1828 else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
1831 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
1832 "unknown mode:%o\n", __func__, mode);
1837 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1839 static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
1844 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
1848 if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1849 u32 sid = current_sid();
1850 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
1851 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1854 return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1857 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1861 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_traceme(parent);
1865 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1868 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1869 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1873 error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1877 return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1880 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1881 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1882 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1883 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1887 error = secondary_ops->capset(new, old,
1888 effective, inheritable, permitted);
1892 return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1895 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
1900 rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1904 return task_has_capability(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1907 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1910 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1913 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1918 end = buffer+buflen;
1924 const char *name = table->procname;
1925 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1926 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1930 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1933 table = table->parent;
1939 memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
1941 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1943 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1948 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1955 rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1959 sid = current_sid();
1961 rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1962 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1964 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1965 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1968 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1969 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1971 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
1972 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1980 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
1981 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1987 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1989 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2001 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2006 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2009 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2015 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2017 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2019 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2022 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2026 rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
2031 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
2032 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2033 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
2035 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
2036 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
2037 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2038 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
2040 case 0: /* Close log */
2041 case 1: /* Open log */
2042 case 2: /* Read from log */
2043 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
2044 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
2046 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
2053 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2054 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2055 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2057 * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
2058 * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
2059 * the capability is granted.
2061 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2062 * processes that allocate mappings.
2064 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2066 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2068 rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2069 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2073 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
2076 /* binprm security operations */
2078 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2080 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2081 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2082 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2083 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2084 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2087 rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_creds(bprm);
2091 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2092 * the script interpreter */
2093 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
2096 old_tsec = current_security();
2097 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2098 isec = inode->i_security;
2100 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2101 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2102 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2104 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2105 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2106 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2107 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2109 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2110 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2111 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2112 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2114 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2115 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2116 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &new_tsec->sid);
2121 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2122 ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2124 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
2125 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2127 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2128 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2129 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2133 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2134 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2135 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2139 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2140 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2144 /* Check for shared state */
2145 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2146 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2147 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2153 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2154 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2156 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2157 struct task_struct *tracer;
2158 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2162 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(current);
2163 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2164 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2170 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2172 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2178 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2179 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2185 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2187 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2188 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
2196 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2197 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2198 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2199 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2201 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2204 return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2207 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
2208 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
2210 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2211 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2212 struct files_struct *files)
2214 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2215 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2216 struct tty_struct *tty;
2217 struct fdtable *fdt;
2221 tty = get_current_tty();
2224 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2225 struct inode *inode;
2227 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2228 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2229 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2230 file may belong to another process and we are only
2231 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2232 file = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files, struct file, f_u.fu_list);
2233 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2234 if (inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2235 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
2242 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2246 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2248 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2250 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2252 unsigned long set, i;
2257 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2258 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2260 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2263 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2264 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2269 if (file_has_perm(cred,
2271 file_to_av(file))) {
2273 fd = get_unused_fd();
2283 devnull = dentry_open(
2285 mntget(selinuxfs_mount),
2287 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2294 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2299 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2302 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2306 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2308 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2310 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2311 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2314 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2315 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2318 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2319 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2321 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2322 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2324 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2325 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2326 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2328 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2329 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2330 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2331 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2332 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2334 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2335 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2337 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2338 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2339 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2340 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2342 update_rlimit_cpu(rlim->rlim_cur);
2347 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2350 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2352 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2353 struct itimerval itimer;
2354 struct sighand_struct *psig;
2357 unsigned long flags;
2365 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2366 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2367 * flush and unblock signals.
2369 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2370 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2372 rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2374 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2375 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2376 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2377 flush_signals(current);
2378 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2379 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2380 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2381 recalc_sigpending();
2382 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2385 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2386 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2387 read_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
2388 psig = current->parent->sighand;
2389 spin_lock_irqsave(&psig->siglock, flags);
2390 wake_up_interruptible(¤t->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
2391 spin_unlock_irqrestore(&psig->siglock, flags);
2392 read_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
2395 /* superblock security operations */
2397 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2399 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2402 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2404 superblock_free_security(sb);
2407 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2412 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2415 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2417 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2418 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2419 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2420 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2421 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2424 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2431 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2435 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2438 int current_size = 0;
2446 while (current_size < len) {
2456 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2458 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2459 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2460 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2466 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2474 in_save = in_end = orig;
2478 open_quote = !open_quote;
2479 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2481 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2483 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2484 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2486 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2488 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2490 } while (*in_end++);
2492 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2493 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2498 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2500 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2501 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2504 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2508 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2509 if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2512 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2513 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
2514 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2517 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2519 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2520 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2522 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2523 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2524 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2527 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2530 unsigned long flags,
2533 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2535 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2536 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
2537 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2539 return dentry_has_perm(cred, path->mnt, path->dentry,
2543 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2545 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2547 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2548 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2551 /* inode security operations */
2553 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2555 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2558 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2560 inode_free_security(inode);
2563 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2564 char **name, void **value,
2567 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2568 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
2569 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2570 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2571 u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2573 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2575 dsec = dir->i_security;
2576 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2579 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2581 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
2582 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2583 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2586 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2587 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2590 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2595 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2596 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2597 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2598 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2600 isec->initialized = 1;
2603 if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2607 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2614 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2626 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2628 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2631 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2633 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2636 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2638 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2641 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2643 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2646 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2648 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2651 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2653 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2656 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2658 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2661 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2662 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2664 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2667 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2669 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2671 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2674 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2676 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2678 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2681 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2683 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2686 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2690 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2691 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2694 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2696 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2698 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2701 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2702 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2703 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2705 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2708 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2710 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2712 return dentry_has_perm(cred, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2715 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2717 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2719 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2720 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2721 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2722 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2724 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2725 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2726 Restrict to administrator. */
2731 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2732 ordinary setattr permission. */
2733 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2736 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2737 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2739 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2740 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2741 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2742 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2743 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2746 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2747 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2749 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2750 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2753 if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
2756 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2757 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
2759 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2760 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2764 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2765 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2766 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2768 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2773 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2774 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2778 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
2783 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2785 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2786 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2790 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2791 const void *value, size_t size,
2794 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2795 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2799 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2800 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2804 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2806 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2807 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2808 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2816 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2818 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2820 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2823 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2825 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2827 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2830 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2832 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2833 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2835 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2836 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2841 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2843 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2845 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2849 char *context = NULL;
2850 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2852 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2856 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2857 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2858 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2859 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2860 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2861 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2862 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2864 error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
2865 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2867 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2870 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2883 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2884 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2886 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2890 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2893 if (!value || !size)
2896 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2904 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2906 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2907 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2908 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2912 static int selinux_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2914 return secondary_ops->inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
2917 static int selinux_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2919 return secondary_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry);
2922 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2924 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2928 /* file security operations */
2930 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2932 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2934 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2937 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2941 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2942 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2945 rc = file_has_perm(cred, file,
2946 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2950 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2953 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2955 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2956 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2957 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2958 u32 sid = current_sid();
2961 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2965 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid
2966 && fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2967 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2969 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2972 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2974 return file_alloc_security(file);
2977 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2979 file_free_security(file);
2982 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2985 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2988 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
2990 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)
2995 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
2998 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3000 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3003 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3004 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3006 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3007 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3008 * This has an additional check.
3010 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
3017 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3018 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3020 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3021 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3024 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3025 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3027 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3034 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3035 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
3036 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
3039 u32 sid = current_sid();
3041 if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
3042 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3043 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3044 if (rc || addr_only)
3047 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3050 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3051 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3054 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3055 unsigned long reqprot,
3058 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3060 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3063 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3064 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3066 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3067 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3068 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3069 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3070 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3071 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3072 rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3073 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3075 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3076 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3077 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3078 * modified content. This typically should only
3079 * occur for text relocations.
3081 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3088 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3091 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3093 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3095 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3098 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3101 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3106 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3111 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3112 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3121 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3122 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3127 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3132 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3136 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3143 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3145 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3147 fsec = file->f_security;
3148 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3153 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3154 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3157 u32 sid = current_sid();
3159 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3161 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3162 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3164 fsec = file->f_security;
3167 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3169 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3171 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3172 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3175 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3177 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3179 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3182 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3184 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3185 struct inode *inode;
3186 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3188 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3189 fsec = file->f_security;
3190 isec = inode->i_security;
3192 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3193 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3194 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3195 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3196 * struct as its SID.
3198 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3199 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3201 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3202 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3203 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3204 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3205 * new inode label or new policy.
3206 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3208 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL);
3211 /* task security operations */
3213 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3215 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3219 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3221 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3223 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3224 cred->security = NULL;
3229 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3231 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3234 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3235 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3237 old_tsec = old->security;
3239 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3243 new->security = tsec;
3248 * set the security data for a kernel service
3249 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3251 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3253 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3254 u32 sid = current_sid();
3257 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3258 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3259 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3263 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3264 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3265 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3271 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3272 * objective context of the specified inode
3274 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3276 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3277 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3278 u32 sid = current_sid();
3281 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3282 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3283 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3287 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3291 static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3293 /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
3294 since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
3295 identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
3296 this operation. However, SELinux does control the use
3297 of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
3302 static int selinux_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3305 return secondary_ops->task_fix_setuid(new, old, flags);
3308 static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
3310 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3314 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3316 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3319 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3321 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3324 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3326 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3329 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3331 *secid = task_sid(p);
3334 static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
3336 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3340 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3344 rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
3348 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3351 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3355 rc = secondary_ops->task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3359 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3362 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3364 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3367 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3369 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
3371 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3372 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3373 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3374 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3375 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3376 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3381 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
3385 rc = secondary_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
3389 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3392 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3394 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3397 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3399 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3402 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3409 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3411 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3413 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3414 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3416 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3420 static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
3426 /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
3427 any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
3428 the state of the current process. */
3429 return secondary_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
3432 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3434 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3437 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3438 struct inode *inode)
3440 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3441 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3444 isec->initialized = 1;
3447 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3448 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3449 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3451 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3452 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3454 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3455 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3459 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3460 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3463 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3464 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3468 *proto = ih->protocol;
3470 switch (ih->protocol) {
3472 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3474 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3478 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3482 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3483 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3488 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3490 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3494 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3498 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3499 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3503 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3504 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3506 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3510 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3514 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3515 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3526 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3528 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3529 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3530 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3533 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3534 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3536 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3537 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3541 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3542 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3545 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3546 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3547 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3556 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3558 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3562 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3563 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3568 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3570 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3574 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3575 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3579 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3580 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3582 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3586 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3587 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3591 /* includes fragments */
3601 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3602 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3607 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3609 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3612 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3613 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3616 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3618 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3621 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3622 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3632 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3633 " unable to parse packet\n");
3643 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3645 * @family: protocol family
3646 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3649 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3650 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3651 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3652 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3653 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3657 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3664 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3665 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3667 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3668 if (unlikely(err)) {
3670 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3671 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3678 /* socket security operations */
3679 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3682 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3683 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3687 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3689 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3691 sid = task_sid(task);
3693 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3694 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3695 err = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3701 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3702 int protocol, int kern)
3704 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3705 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3714 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ?: sid;
3716 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3717 err = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3723 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3724 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3726 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3727 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3728 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3729 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3734 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
3736 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3739 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3745 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3746 isec->initialized = 1;
3749 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3750 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3751 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3752 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock);
3758 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3759 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3760 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3762 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3767 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3772 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3773 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3774 * check the first address now.
3776 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3777 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3779 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3780 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3781 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3782 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3783 unsigned short snum;
3784 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3787 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3789 if (family == PF_INET) {
3790 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3791 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3792 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3794 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3795 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3796 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3802 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3804 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3805 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3809 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3810 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3811 ad.u.net.family = family;
3812 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3814 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3820 switch (isec->sclass) {
3821 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3822 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3825 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3826 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3829 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3830 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3834 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3838 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3842 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3843 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3844 ad.u.net.family = family;
3846 if (family == PF_INET)
3847 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3849 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3851 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3852 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3860 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3862 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3863 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3866 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3871 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3873 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3874 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3875 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3876 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3877 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3878 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3879 unsigned short snum;
3882 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3883 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3884 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3886 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3888 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3889 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3891 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3894 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3898 perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3899 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3901 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3902 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3903 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3904 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3909 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
3915 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3917 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3920 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3923 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3924 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3926 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3930 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3932 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3933 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3934 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3935 newisec->initialized = 1;
3940 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3945 rc = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3949 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(SOCK_INODE(sock), MAY_WRITE);
3952 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3953 int size, int flags)
3955 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3958 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3960 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3963 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3965 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3968 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
3972 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3976 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
3979 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3982 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3985 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3987 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3990 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3991 struct socket *other,
3994 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3995 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3996 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3997 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4000 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4001 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
4003 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4004 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
4006 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
4008 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4012 /* connecting socket */
4013 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4014 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
4016 /* server child socket */
4017 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
4018 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
4019 err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
4024 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4025 struct socket *other)
4027 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4028 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
4029 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4032 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4033 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
4035 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4036 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
4038 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
4039 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
4046 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
4048 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
4054 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4057 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4058 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4062 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4065 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4066 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4069 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4070 struct sk_buff *skb,
4071 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4076 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4078 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, recv_perm;
4079 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4081 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4082 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4085 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4086 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
4087 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
4088 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4090 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4091 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
4092 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
4093 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4095 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4096 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_RECV;
4097 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_RECV;
4098 recv_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4101 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
4102 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
4107 err = sel_netif_sid(skb->iif, &if_sid);
4110 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4114 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4117 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4123 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4124 ntohs(ad->u.net.sport), &port_sid);
4125 if (unlikely(err)) {
4127 "SELinux: failure in"
4128 " selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(),"
4129 " network port label not found\n");
4132 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, recv_perm, ad);
4135 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4139 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4141 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4142 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4145 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4146 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4147 ad.u.net.family = family;
4148 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4152 if (selinux_compat_net)
4153 err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, &ad,
4155 else if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4156 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4161 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
4162 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4165 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
4166 SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad);
4168 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4170 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4173 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4179 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4182 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4183 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4184 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4185 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4190 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4193 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4194 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4197 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4198 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4199 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4200 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4201 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4202 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4204 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4205 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4206 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4209 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4210 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4211 ad.u.net.family = family;
4212 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4216 if (peerlbl_active) {
4219 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4222 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->iif, addrp, family,
4225 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4228 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4231 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4234 if (secmark_active) {
4235 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4244 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4245 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4250 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4251 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4252 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4254 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4256 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4257 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
4258 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4259 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4261 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
4266 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4271 if (scontext_len > len) {
4276 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4280 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4288 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4290 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4293 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4295 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4298 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4302 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4303 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4305 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4308 *secid = peer_secid;
4309 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4314 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4316 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
4319 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4321 sk_free_security(sk);
4324 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4326 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
4327 struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
4329 newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
4330 newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4331 newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
4333 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec, newsk->sk_family);
4336 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4339 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4341 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4343 *secid = sksec->sid;
4347 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4349 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4350 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4352 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4353 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4354 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4355 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4358 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4359 struct request_sock *req)
4361 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4363 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4367 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4368 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4371 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4374 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4375 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4376 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4380 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4384 req->secid = newsid;
4385 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4389 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4390 const struct request_sock *req)
4392 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4394 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4395 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4396 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4397 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4398 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4399 time it will have been created and available. */
4401 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4402 * thread with access to newsksec */
4403 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family);
4406 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4408 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4409 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4411 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4412 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4415 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4417 selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_established(sk, family);
4420 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4423 fl->secid = req->secid;
4426 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4430 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4431 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
4432 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4434 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4438 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4440 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4442 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4443 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4444 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4445 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4446 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
4447 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4457 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
4462 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4464 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4470 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4475 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4478 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4479 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4480 peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4481 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4484 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4487 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4488 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4489 ad.u.net.family = family;
4490 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4493 if (peerlbl_active) {
4494 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4497 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4503 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4504 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4508 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4509 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4510 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4512 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4518 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4519 struct sk_buff *skb,
4520 const struct net_device *in,
4521 const struct net_device *out,
4522 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4524 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4527 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4528 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4529 struct sk_buff *skb,
4530 const struct net_device *in,
4531 const struct net_device *out,
4532 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4534 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4538 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4543 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4546 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4547 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4548 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4550 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
4553 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4554 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4560 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
4561 struct sk_buff *skb,
4562 const struct net_device *in,
4563 const struct net_device *out,
4564 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4566 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4569 static int selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4571 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4572 u16 family, char *addrp)
4575 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4577 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, send_perm;
4578 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4580 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4581 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4584 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4585 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
4586 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
4587 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4589 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4590 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
4591 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
4592 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4594 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4595 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_SEND;
4596 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_SEND;
4597 send_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4600 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
4601 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
4606 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4609 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4612 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4615 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4622 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4623 ntohs(ad->u.net.dport), &port_sid);
4624 if (unlikely(err)) {
4626 "SELinux: failure in"
4627 " selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(),"
4628 " network port label not found\n");
4631 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, send_perm, ad);
4634 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4638 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4639 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4640 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4646 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4648 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4649 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4650 ad.u.net.family = family;
4651 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4654 if (selinux_compat_net) {
4655 if (selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(skb->sk, ifindex,
4656 &ad, family, addrp))
4658 } else if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4659 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4660 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4664 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4665 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4671 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4677 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4682 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4683 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4684 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4685 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4686 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4687 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4689 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4690 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4691 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4692 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4693 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4694 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4695 if (skb->dst != NULL && skb->dst->xfrm != NULL)
4698 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4699 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4700 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4703 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4704 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4705 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4706 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4711 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_FORWARDED)
4712 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4714 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4717 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_FORWARDED)
4718 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4720 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4725 if (secmark_perm == PACKET__FORWARD_OUT) {
4726 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4729 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4731 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4732 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4733 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4736 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4737 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4738 ad.u.net.family = family;
4739 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
4743 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4744 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4747 if (peerlbl_active) {
4751 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4753 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4754 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4757 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4759 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4760 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4767 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4768 struct sk_buff *skb,
4769 const struct net_device *in,
4770 const struct net_device *out,
4771 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4773 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4776 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4777 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4778 struct sk_buff *skb,
4779 const struct net_device *in,
4780 const struct net_device *out,
4781 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4783 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4787 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4789 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4793 err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
4797 if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
4798 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4803 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4806 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4808 err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4812 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4813 ad.u.cap = capability;
4815 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
4816 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4819 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4820 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4823 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4826 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4830 sid = task_sid(task);
4831 isec->sclass = sclass;
4833 perm->security = isec;
4838 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4840 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4841 perm->security = NULL;
4845 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4847 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4849 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4853 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4854 msg->security = msec;
4859 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4861 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4863 msg->security = NULL;
4867 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4870 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4871 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4872 u32 sid = current_sid();
4874 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4876 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4877 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4879 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4882 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4884 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4887 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4889 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4892 /* message queue security operations */
4893 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4895 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4896 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4897 u32 sid = current_sid();
4900 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4904 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4906 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4907 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4909 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4912 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4918 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4920 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4923 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4925 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4926 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4927 u32 sid = current_sid();
4929 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4931 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4932 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4934 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4935 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4938 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4946 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4947 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4950 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4953 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4956 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4962 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4966 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4968 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4969 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4970 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4971 u32 sid = current_sid();
4974 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4975 msec = msg->security;
4978 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4980 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4982 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4983 * message queue this message will be stored in
4985 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
4991 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4992 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4994 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4995 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4998 /* Can this process send the message */
4999 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
5002 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
5003 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5004 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
5009 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
5010 struct task_struct *target,
5011 long type, int mode)
5013 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5014 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5015 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5016 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
5019 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5020 msec = msg->security;
5022 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5023 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5025 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
5026 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
5028 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
5029 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
5033 /* Shared Memory security operations */
5034 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5036 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5037 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5038 u32 sid = current_sid();
5041 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
5045 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5047 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5048 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5050 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5053 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5059 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5061 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5064 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
5066 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5067 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5068 u32 sid = current_sid();
5070 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5072 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5073 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5075 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5076 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5079 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5080 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
5088 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5089 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5092 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
5095 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5102 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5108 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5112 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5113 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5118 rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
5122 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5125 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5127 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5130 /* Semaphore security operations */
5131 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5133 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5134 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5135 u32 sid = current_sid();
5138 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5142 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5144 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5145 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5147 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5150 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5156 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5158 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5161 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5163 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5164 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5165 u32 sid = current_sid();
5167 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5169 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5170 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5172 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5173 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5176 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5177 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5185 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5186 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5190 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5201 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5204 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5208 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5214 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5218 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5219 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5224 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5228 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5231 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5237 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5239 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5244 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5247 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5249 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5253 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5256 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5259 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5260 char *name, char **value)
5262 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5268 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5274 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5276 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5278 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5280 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5281 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5282 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5283 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5284 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5285 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5286 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5287 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5295 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5305 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5306 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5308 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5309 struct task_struct *tracer;
5316 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5317 security attributes. */
5322 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5323 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5324 * above restriction is ever removed.
5326 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5327 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5328 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5329 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5330 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5331 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5332 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5333 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5334 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5335 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5341 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5342 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5343 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5347 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5348 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5349 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5351 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5358 new = prepare_creds();
5362 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5363 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5364 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5365 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5366 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5367 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5368 tsec = new->security;
5369 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5370 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5371 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5372 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5373 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5374 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5377 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5378 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5379 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5380 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5385 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5387 if (!is_single_threaded(p)) {
5388 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5393 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5394 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5395 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5399 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5400 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5403 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p);
5405 ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5409 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5410 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5429 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5431 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5434 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5436 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5439 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5446 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5447 unsigned long flags)
5449 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5450 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5452 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5456 tsec = cred->security;
5457 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5458 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5460 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5466 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5468 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5474 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5475 const struct cred *cred,
5479 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5482 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5483 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5484 appear to be created. */
5488 sid = cred_sid(cred);
5490 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5491 ksec = key->security;
5493 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5496 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5498 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5499 char *context = NULL;
5503 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5512 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5515 .ptrace_may_access = selinux_ptrace_may_access,
5516 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5517 .capget = selinux_capget,
5518 .capset = selinux_capset,
5519 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
5520 .capable = selinux_capable,
5521 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5522 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5523 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5524 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5526 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5527 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
5529 .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds,
5530 .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
5531 .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
5532 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5534 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5535 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5536 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5537 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5538 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5539 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5540 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5541 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5542 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5543 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5544 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5547 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5548 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5549 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5550 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5551 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5552 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5553 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5554 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5555 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5556 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5557 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5558 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5559 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5560 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5561 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5562 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5563 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5564 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5565 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5566 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5567 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5568 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5569 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5570 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5571 .inode_need_killpriv = selinux_inode_need_killpriv,
5572 .inode_killpriv = selinux_inode_killpriv,
5573 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5575 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5576 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5577 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5578 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5579 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
5580 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5581 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5582 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5583 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5584 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5585 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5587 .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
5589 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5590 .cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
5591 .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare,
5592 .kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as,
5593 .kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
5594 .task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid,
5595 .task_fix_setuid = selinux_task_fix_setuid,
5596 .task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid,
5597 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5598 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5599 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5600 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5601 .task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups,
5602 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5603 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5604 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5605 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5606 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5607 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5608 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5609 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5610 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5611 .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl,
5612 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5614 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5615 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5617 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5618 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5620 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5621 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5622 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5623 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5624 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5625 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5627 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5628 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5629 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5630 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5631 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5633 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5634 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5635 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5636 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5637 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5639 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5641 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5642 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5644 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5645 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5646 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5648 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5649 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5651 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5652 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5653 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5654 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5655 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5656 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5657 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5658 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5659 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5660 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5661 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5662 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5663 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5664 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5665 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5666 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5667 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5668 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5669 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5670 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5671 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5672 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5673 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5674 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5675 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5677 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5678 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5679 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5680 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5681 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5682 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5683 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5684 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5685 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5686 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5687 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5691 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5692 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5693 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5694 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5698 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5699 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5700 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5701 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5705 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5707 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5708 selinux_enabled = 0;
5712 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5713 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5717 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5719 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5720 cred_init_security();
5722 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5723 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5724 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5727 secondary_ops = security_ops;
5729 panic("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
5730 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5731 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5733 if (selinux_enforcing)
5734 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5736 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5741 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5743 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5745 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5746 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5747 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5748 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5750 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
5751 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
5752 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
5753 struct superblock_security_struct,
5755 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
5757 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5758 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5759 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
5761 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5763 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5764 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5765 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
5768 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5769 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5772 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5773 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5774 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5776 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5778 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5780 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5781 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5783 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5784 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5787 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5788 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5790 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5791 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5794 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
5795 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5797 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
5798 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5802 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5804 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5806 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5807 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5809 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5810 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5813 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5814 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5816 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5817 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5823 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5827 if (!selinux_enabled)
5830 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5832 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5834 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5836 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5837 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5839 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5846 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5848 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5849 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5851 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5853 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5854 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5855 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5860 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5862 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5863 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5866 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5868 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5869 static int selinux_disabled;
5871 int selinux_disable(void)
5873 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5875 if (ss_initialized) {
5876 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5880 if (selinux_disabled) {
5881 /* Only do this once. */
5885 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5887 selinux_disabled = 1;
5888 selinux_enabled = 0;
5890 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
5891 security_ops = secondary_ops;
5893 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5894 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5896 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */