2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
27 #include <linux/kernel.h>
28 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
29 #include <linux/errno.h>
30 #include <linux/sched.h>
31 #include <linux/security.h>
32 #include <linux/xattr.h>
33 #include <linux/capability.h>
34 #include <linux/unistd.h>
36 #include <linux/mman.h>
37 #include <linux/slab.h>
38 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
39 #include <linux/swap.h>
40 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
41 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
42 #include <linux/file.h>
43 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
44 #include <linux/namei.h>
45 #include <linux/mount.h>
46 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
49 #include <linux/tty.h>
51 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
52 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
53 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
54 #include <net/netlabel.h>
55 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
56 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
57 #include <asm/atomic.h>
58 #include <linux/bitops.h>
59 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
60 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
62 #include <linux/tcp.h>
63 #include <linux/udp.h>
64 #include <linux/dccp.h>
65 #include <linux/quota.h>
66 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
67 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
68 #include <linux/parser.h>
69 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
71 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
72 #include <linux/personality.h>
73 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
74 #include <linux/audit.h>
75 #include <linux/string.h>
76 #include <linux/selinux.h>
77 #include <linux/mutex.h>
78 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
89 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
90 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
92 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
94 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
95 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
96 extern int selinux_compat_net;
97 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
99 /* SECMARK reference count */
100 atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
102 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
103 int selinux_enforcing;
105 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
107 unsigned long enforcing;
108 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
109 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
112 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
115 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
116 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
118 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
120 unsigned long enabled;
121 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
122 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
125 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
127 int selinux_enabled = 1;
132 * Minimal support for a secondary security module,
133 * just to allow the use of the capability module.
135 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops;
137 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
138 before the policy was loaded. */
139 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
140 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
142 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
145 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
148 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
149 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
150 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
151 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
154 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
156 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
160 * initialise the security for the init task
162 static void cred_init_security(void)
164 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
165 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
167 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
169 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
171 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
172 cred->security = tsec;
176 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
178 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
180 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
182 tsec = cred->security;
187 * get the objective security ID of a task
189 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
194 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
200 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
202 static inline u32 current_sid(void)
204 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_cred()->security;
209 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
211 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
213 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
214 u32 sid = current_sid();
216 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
220 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
221 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
223 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
224 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
225 isec->task_sid = sid;
226 inode->i_security = isec;
231 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
233 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
234 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
236 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
237 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
238 list_del_init(&isec->list);
239 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
241 inode->i_security = NULL;
242 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
245 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
247 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
248 u32 sid = current_sid();
250 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
255 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
256 file->f_security = fsec;
261 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
263 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
264 file->f_security = NULL;
268 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
270 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
272 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
276 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
277 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
278 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
279 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
281 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
282 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
283 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
284 sb->s_security = sbsec;
289 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
291 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
293 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
294 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
295 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
296 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
298 sb->s_security = NULL;
302 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
304 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
306 ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
310 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
311 ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
312 sk->sk_security = ssec;
314 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec, family);
319 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
321 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
323 sk->sk_security = NULL;
324 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(ssec);
328 /* The security server must be initialized before
329 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
330 extern int ss_initialized;
332 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
334 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
336 "uses transition SIDs",
338 "uses genfs_contexts",
339 "not configured for labeling",
340 "uses mountpoint labeling",
343 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
345 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
347 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
356 Opt_labelsupport = 5,
359 static const match_table_t tokens = {
360 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
361 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
362 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
363 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
364 {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
368 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
370 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
371 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
372 const struct cred *cred)
374 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
377 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
378 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
382 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
383 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
387 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
388 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
389 const struct cred *cred)
391 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
393 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
394 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
398 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
399 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
403 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
405 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
406 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
407 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
410 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
411 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
412 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
413 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
414 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
415 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
416 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
417 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
418 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
422 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
423 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
424 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
425 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
426 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
427 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
429 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
430 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
431 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
436 sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP);
438 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
439 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
440 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
442 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
443 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
444 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
446 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS ||
447 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT ||
448 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE ||
449 sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
450 sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP;
452 /* Initialize the root inode. */
453 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
455 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
456 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
457 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
459 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
461 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
462 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
463 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
464 struct inode_security_struct, list);
465 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
466 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
467 inode = igrab(inode);
469 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
473 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
474 list_del_init(&isec->list);
477 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
483 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
484 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
485 * mount options, or whatever.
487 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
488 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
491 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
492 char *context = NULL;
496 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
498 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
504 tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
505 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
506 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
508 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
511 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
512 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)
513 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
515 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
516 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
521 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
522 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
528 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
529 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
532 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
533 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
535 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
536 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
539 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
540 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
542 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
543 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
546 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
547 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
549 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
550 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
551 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
553 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
556 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
557 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
559 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) {
560 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
561 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP;
564 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
569 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
573 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
574 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
576 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
578 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
579 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
580 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
581 (old_sid != new_sid))
584 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
585 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
587 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
588 if (mnt_flags & flag)
594 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
595 * labeling information.
597 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
598 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
600 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
602 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
603 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
604 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
605 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
606 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
607 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
608 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
609 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
610 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
612 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
614 if (!ss_initialized) {
616 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
617 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
618 server is ready to handle calls. */
619 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
620 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
621 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
622 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
626 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
627 "before the security server is initialized\n");
632 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
633 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
634 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
635 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
637 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
638 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
639 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
640 * will be used for both mounts)
642 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
647 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
648 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
649 * than once with different security options.
651 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
654 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
656 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
657 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
659 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
660 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
661 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
668 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
670 goto out_double_mount;
672 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
677 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
679 goto out_double_mount;
681 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
683 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
684 rootcontext_sid = sid;
686 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
688 goto out_double_mount;
690 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
694 defcontext_sid = sid;
696 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
698 goto out_double_mount;
700 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
709 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
710 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
711 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
712 goto out_double_mount;
717 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
718 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
720 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
721 rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
723 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
724 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
728 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
730 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
734 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
738 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
739 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
740 * the superblock context if not already set.
743 if (!fscontext_sid) {
744 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
748 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
750 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
755 if (!rootcontext_sid)
756 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
758 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
759 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
762 if (rootcontext_sid) {
763 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
768 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
769 root_isec->initialized = 1;
772 if (defcontext_sid) {
773 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
775 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
776 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
780 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
781 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
787 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
790 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
792 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
796 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
797 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
801 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
802 struct super_block *newsb)
804 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
805 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
807 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
808 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
809 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
812 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
813 * mount options. thus we can safely put this sb on the list and deal
816 if (!ss_initialized) {
817 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
818 if (list_empty(&newsbsec->list))
819 list_add(&newsbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
820 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
824 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
825 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
827 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
828 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
831 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
833 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
835 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
836 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
837 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
840 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
844 if (!set_rootcontext) {
845 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
846 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
849 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
851 if (set_rootcontext) {
852 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
853 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
854 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
855 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
857 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
860 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
861 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
864 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
865 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
868 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
869 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
870 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
872 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
874 /* Standard string-based options. */
875 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
877 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
882 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
886 if (context || defcontext) {
888 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
891 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
901 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
904 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
911 case Opt_rootcontext:
914 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
917 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
925 if (context || defcontext) {
927 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
930 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
936 case Opt_labelsupport:
940 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
947 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
951 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
952 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
953 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
958 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
959 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
962 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
963 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
966 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
967 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
970 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
971 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
974 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
985 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
987 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
990 char *options = data;
991 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
993 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
998 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
1000 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
1005 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1008 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1012 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
1013 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
1018 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
1021 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
1022 has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
1026 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
1028 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
1031 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
1033 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
1034 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
1036 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
1037 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
1039 case SE_SBLABELSUPP:
1041 seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
1046 /* we need a comma before each option */
1048 seq_puts(m, prefix);
1051 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
1057 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1059 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1062 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1064 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1070 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1072 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1077 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1079 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1081 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1083 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1085 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1087 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1089 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1091 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1093 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1097 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1100 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1102 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1105 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1107 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1110 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1116 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1117 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1119 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1126 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1127 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1129 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1131 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1132 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1134 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1136 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1138 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1144 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1145 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1146 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1147 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1148 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1150 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1152 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1153 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1154 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1156 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1157 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1158 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1159 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1160 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1161 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1162 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1164 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1167 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1169 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1171 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1174 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1177 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1178 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1183 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1185 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1190 end = buffer+buflen;
1195 while (de && de != de->parent) {
1196 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
1200 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
1205 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1206 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1210 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1218 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1219 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1221 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1222 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1224 struct dentry *dentry;
1225 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1226 char *context = NULL;
1230 if (isec->initialized)
1233 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1234 if (isec->initialized)
1237 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1238 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1239 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1240 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1241 server is ready to handle calls. */
1242 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1243 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1244 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1245 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1249 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1250 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1251 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1252 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1256 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1257 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1259 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1260 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1262 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1263 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1266 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: no dentry for dev=%s "
1267 "ino=%ld\n", __func__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
1272 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1273 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1279 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1281 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1282 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1283 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1291 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1297 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1303 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1304 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1305 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1306 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1310 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1311 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1314 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1318 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1319 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1320 __func__, context, -rc,
1321 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1323 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1331 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1332 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1334 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1335 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1336 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1338 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1339 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1340 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
1348 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1349 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1352 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1353 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1355 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1356 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
1358 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1359 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
1370 isec->initialized = 1;
1373 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1375 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1376 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1380 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1381 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1387 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1388 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1391 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1392 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1395 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1396 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1399 /* All other signals. */
1400 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1408 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1409 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1411 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1412 const struct cred *target,
1415 u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1417 return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1421 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1422 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1423 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1424 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1426 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1427 const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1430 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1434 __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1435 __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1437 return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1441 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1442 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1443 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1444 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1446 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1451 sid = current_sid();
1452 tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1453 return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1456 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1457 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1460 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1461 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1462 const struct cred *cred,
1465 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1466 struct av_decision avd;
1468 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1469 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1472 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1476 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1478 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1481 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1485 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1489 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1490 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT)
1491 avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1495 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1496 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1499 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1501 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1502 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1505 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1506 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1507 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1508 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1509 struct inode *inode,
1511 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
1513 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1514 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1517 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1520 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1521 isec = inode->i_security;
1525 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1526 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1529 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1532 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1533 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1534 pathname if needed. */
1535 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1536 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1537 struct dentry *dentry,
1540 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1541 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1543 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1544 ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
1545 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1546 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1549 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1550 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1551 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1552 check a particular permission to the file.
1553 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1554 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1555 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1556 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1557 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1561 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1562 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1563 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1564 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1567 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1568 ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
1570 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1571 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1579 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1582 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1588 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1589 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1590 struct dentry *dentry,
1593 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1594 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
1595 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1596 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1598 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1601 dsec = dir->i_security;
1602 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1605 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1607 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1608 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1610 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1611 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1616 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
1617 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, &newsid);
1622 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1626 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1627 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1628 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1631 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1632 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1633 struct task_struct *ctx)
1635 u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1637 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1641 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1644 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1645 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1646 struct dentry *dentry,
1650 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1651 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1652 u32 sid = current_sid();
1656 dsec = dir->i_security;
1657 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1659 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1660 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1663 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1664 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1679 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1684 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1688 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1689 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1690 struct inode *new_dir,
1691 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1693 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1694 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1695 u32 sid = current_sid();
1697 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1700 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1701 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1702 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1703 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1705 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1707 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
1708 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1709 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1712 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1713 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1716 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1717 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1718 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1723 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry;
1724 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1725 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1726 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1727 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1730 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1731 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1732 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1733 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1735 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1743 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1744 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1745 struct super_block *sb,
1747 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1749 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1750 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1752 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1753 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1756 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1757 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1761 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1762 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1763 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1764 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1767 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1769 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1773 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1775 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1777 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1784 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1785 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1789 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1791 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1792 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1799 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1808 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1811 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1813 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1815 if (selinux_policycap_openperm) {
1816 mode_t mode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode;
1818 * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
1822 else if (S_ISCHR(mode))
1823 av |= CHR_FILE__OPEN;
1824 else if (S_ISBLK(mode))
1825 av |= BLK_FILE__OPEN;
1826 else if (S_ISFIFO(mode))
1827 av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
1828 else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
1831 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
1832 "unknown mode:%o\n", __func__, mode);
1837 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1839 static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
1844 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
1848 if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1849 u32 sid = current_sid();
1850 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
1851 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1854 return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1857 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1861 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_traceme(parent);
1865 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1868 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1869 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1873 error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1877 return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1880 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1881 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1882 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1883 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1887 error = secondary_ops->capset(new, old,
1888 effective, inheritable, permitted);
1892 return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1895 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
1900 rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1904 return task_has_capability(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1907 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1910 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1913 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1918 end = buffer+buflen;
1924 const char *name = table->procname;
1925 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1926 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1930 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1933 table = table->parent;
1939 memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
1941 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1943 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1948 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1955 rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1959 sid = current_sid();
1961 rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1962 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1964 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1965 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1968 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1969 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1971 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
1972 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1980 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
1981 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1987 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1989 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2001 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2006 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2009 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2015 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2017 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2019 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2022 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2026 rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
2031 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
2032 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2033 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
2035 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
2036 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
2037 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2038 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
2040 case 0: /* Close log */
2041 case 1: /* Open log */
2042 case 2: /* Read from log */
2043 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
2044 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
2046 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
2053 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2054 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2055 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2057 * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
2058 * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
2059 * the capability is granted.
2061 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2062 * processes that allocate mappings.
2064 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2066 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2068 rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2069 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2073 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
2076 /* binprm security operations */
2078 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2080 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2081 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2082 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2083 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2084 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2087 rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_creds(bprm);
2091 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2092 * the script interpreter */
2093 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
2096 old_tsec = current_security();
2097 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2098 isec = inode->i_security;
2100 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2101 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2102 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2104 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2105 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2106 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2107 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2109 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2110 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2111 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2112 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2114 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2115 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2116 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &new_tsec->sid);
2121 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2122 ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2124 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
2125 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2127 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2128 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2129 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2133 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2134 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2135 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2139 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2140 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2144 /* Check for shared state */
2145 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2146 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2147 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2153 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2154 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2156 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2157 struct task_struct *tracer;
2158 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2162 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(current);
2163 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2164 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2170 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2172 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2178 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2179 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2185 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2187 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2188 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
2196 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2197 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2198 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2199 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2201 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2204 return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2207 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
2208 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
2210 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2211 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2212 struct files_struct *files)
2214 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2215 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2216 struct tty_struct *tty;
2217 struct fdtable *fdt;
2221 tty = get_current_tty();
2224 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2225 struct inode *inode;
2227 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2228 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2229 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2230 file may belong to another process and we are only
2231 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2232 file = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files, struct file, f_u.fu_list);
2233 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2234 if (inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2235 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
2242 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2246 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2248 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2250 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2252 unsigned long set, i;
2257 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2258 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2260 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2263 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2264 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2269 if (file_has_perm(cred,
2271 file_to_av(file))) {
2273 fd = get_unused_fd();
2283 devnull = dentry_open(
2285 mntget(selinuxfs_mount),
2287 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2294 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2299 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2302 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2306 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2308 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2310 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2311 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2314 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2315 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2318 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2319 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2321 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2322 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2324 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2325 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2326 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2328 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2329 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2330 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2331 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2332 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2334 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2335 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2337 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2338 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2339 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2340 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2342 update_rlimit_cpu(rlim->rlim_cur);
2347 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2350 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2352 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2353 struct itimerval itimer;
2354 struct sighand_struct *psig;
2357 unsigned long flags;
2365 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2366 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2367 * flush and unblock signals.
2369 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2370 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2372 rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2374 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2375 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2376 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2377 flush_signals(current);
2378 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2379 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2380 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2381 recalc_sigpending();
2382 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2385 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2386 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2387 read_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
2388 psig = current->parent->sighand;
2389 spin_lock_irqsave(&psig->siglock, flags);
2390 wake_up_interruptible(¤t->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
2391 spin_unlock_irqrestore(&psig->siglock, flags);
2392 read_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
2395 /* superblock security operations */
2397 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2399 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2402 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2404 superblock_free_security(sb);
2407 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2412 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2415 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2417 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2418 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2419 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2420 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2421 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2424 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2431 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2435 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2438 int current_size = 0;
2446 while (current_size < len) {
2456 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2458 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2459 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2460 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2466 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2474 in_save = in_end = orig;
2478 open_quote = !open_quote;
2479 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2481 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2483 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2484 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2486 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2488 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2490 } while (*in_end++);
2492 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2493 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2498 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2500 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2501 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2504 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2508 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2509 if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2512 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2513 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
2514 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2517 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2519 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2520 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2522 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2523 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2524 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2527 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2530 unsigned long flags,
2533 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2535 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2536 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
2537 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2539 return dentry_has_perm(cred, path->mnt, path->dentry,
2543 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2545 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2547 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2548 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2551 /* inode security operations */
2553 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2555 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2558 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2560 inode_free_security(inode);
2563 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2564 char **name, void **value,
2567 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2568 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
2569 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2570 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2571 u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2573 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2575 dsec = dir->i_security;
2576 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2579 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2581 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
2582 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2583 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2586 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2587 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2590 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2595 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2596 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2597 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2598 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2600 isec->initialized = 1;
2603 if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2607 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2614 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2626 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2628 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2631 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2633 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2636 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2638 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2641 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2643 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2646 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2648 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2651 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2653 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2656 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2658 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2661 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2662 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2664 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2667 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2669 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2671 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2674 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2676 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2678 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2681 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2683 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2686 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2690 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2691 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2694 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2696 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2698 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2701 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2702 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2703 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2705 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2708 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2710 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2712 return dentry_has_perm(cred, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2715 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2717 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2719 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2720 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2721 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2722 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2724 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2725 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2726 Restrict to administrator. */
2731 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2732 ordinary setattr permission. */
2733 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2736 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2737 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2739 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2740 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2741 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2742 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2743 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2746 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2747 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2749 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2750 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2753 if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
2756 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2757 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
2759 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2760 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2764 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2765 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2766 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2768 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2773 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2774 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2778 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
2783 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2785 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2786 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2790 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2791 const void *value, size_t size,
2794 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2795 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2799 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2800 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2804 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2806 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2807 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2808 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2816 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2818 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2820 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2823 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2825 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2827 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2830 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2832 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2833 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2835 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2836 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2841 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2843 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2845 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2849 char *context = NULL;
2850 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2852 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2856 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2857 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2858 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2859 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2860 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2861 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2862 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2864 error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
2865 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2867 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2870 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2883 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2884 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2886 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2890 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2893 if (!value || !size)
2896 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2904 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2906 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2907 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2908 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2912 static int selinux_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2914 return secondary_ops->inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
2917 static int selinux_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2919 return secondary_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry);
2922 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2924 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2928 /* file security operations */
2930 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2932 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2934 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2937 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2941 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2942 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2945 rc = file_has_perm(cred, file,
2946 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2950 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2953 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2955 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2956 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2957 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2958 u32 sid = current_sid();
2961 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2965 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid
2966 && fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2967 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2969 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2972 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2974 return file_alloc_security(file);
2977 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2979 file_free_security(file);
2982 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2985 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2988 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
2990 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)
2995 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
2998 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3000 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3003 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3004 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3006 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3007 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3008 * This has an additional check.
3010 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
3017 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3018 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3020 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3021 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3024 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3025 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3027 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3034 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3035 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
3036 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
3039 u32 sid = current_sid();
3041 if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
3042 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3043 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3044 if (rc || addr_only)
3047 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3050 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3051 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3054 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3055 unsigned long reqprot,
3058 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3061 rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
3065 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3068 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3069 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3071 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3072 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3073 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3074 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3075 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3076 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3077 rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3078 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3080 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3081 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3082 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3083 * modified content. This typically should only
3084 * occur for text relocations.
3086 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3093 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3096 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3098 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3100 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3103 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3106 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3111 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3116 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3117 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3126 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3127 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3132 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3137 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3141 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3148 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3150 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3152 fsec = file->f_security;
3153 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3158 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3159 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3162 u32 sid = current_sid();
3164 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3166 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3167 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3169 fsec = file->f_security;
3172 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3174 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3176 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3177 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3180 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3182 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3184 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3187 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3189 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3190 struct inode *inode;
3191 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3193 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3194 fsec = file->f_security;
3195 isec = inode->i_security;
3197 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3198 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3199 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3200 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3201 * struct as its SID.
3203 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3204 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3206 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3207 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3208 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3209 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3210 * new inode label or new policy.
3211 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3213 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL);
3216 /* task security operations */
3218 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3222 rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
3226 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3230 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3232 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3234 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3235 cred->security = NULL;
3240 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3242 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3245 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3246 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3248 old_tsec = old->security;
3250 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3254 new->security = tsec;
3259 * commit new credentials
3261 static void selinux_cred_commit(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3263 secondary_ops->cred_commit(new, old);
3267 * set the security data for a kernel service
3268 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3270 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3272 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3273 u32 sid = current_sid();
3276 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3277 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3278 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3282 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3283 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3284 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3290 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3291 * objective context of the specified inode
3293 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3295 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3296 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3297 u32 sid = current_sid();
3300 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3301 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3302 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3306 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3310 static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3312 /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
3313 since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
3314 identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
3315 this operation. However, SELinux does control the use
3316 of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
3321 static int selinux_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3324 return secondary_ops->task_fix_setuid(new, old, flags);
3327 static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
3329 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3333 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3335 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3338 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3340 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3343 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3345 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3348 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3350 *secid = task_sid(p);
3353 static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
3355 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3359 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3363 rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
3367 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3370 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3374 rc = secondary_ops->task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3378 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3381 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3383 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3386 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3388 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
3391 rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
3395 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3396 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3397 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3398 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3399 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3400 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3405 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
3409 rc = secondary_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
3413 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3416 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3418 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3421 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3423 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3426 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3432 rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
3437 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3439 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3441 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3442 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3444 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3448 static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
3454 /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
3455 any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
3456 the state of the current process. */
3457 return secondary_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
3460 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3462 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3465 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3466 struct inode *inode)
3468 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3469 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3472 isec->initialized = 1;
3475 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3476 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3477 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3479 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3480 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3482 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3483 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3487 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3488 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3491 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3492 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3496 *proto = ih->protocol;
3498 switch (ih->protocol) {
3500 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3502 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3506 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3510 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3511 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3516 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3518 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3522 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3526 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3527 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3531 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3532 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3534 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3538 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3542 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3543 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3554 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3556 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3557 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3558 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3561 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3562 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3564 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3565 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3569 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3570 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3573 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3574 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3575 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3584 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3586 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3590 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3591 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3596 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3598 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3602 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3603 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3607 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3608 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3610 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3614 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3615 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3619 /* includes fragments */
3629 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3630 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3635 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3637 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3640 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3641 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3644 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3646 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3649 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3650 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3660 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3661 " unable to parse packet\n");
3671 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3673 * @family: protocol family
3674 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3677 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3678 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3679 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3680 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3681 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3685 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3692 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3693 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3695 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3696 if (unlikely(err)) {
3698 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3699 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3706 /* socket security operations */
3707 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3710 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3711 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3715 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3717 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3719 sid = task_sid(task);
3721 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3722 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3723 err = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3729 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3730 int protocol, int kern)
3732 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3733 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3742 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ?: sid;
3744 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3745 err = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3751 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3752 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3754 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3755 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3756 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3757 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3762 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
3764 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3767 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3773 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3774 isec->initialized = 1;
3777 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3778 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3779 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3780 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock);
3786 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3787 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3788 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3790 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3795 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3800 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3801 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3802 * check the first address now.
3804 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3805 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3807 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3808 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3809 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3810 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3811 unsigned short snum;
3812 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3815 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3817 if (family == PF_INET) {
3818 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3819 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3820 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3822 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3823 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3824 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3830 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3832 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3833 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3837 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3838 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3839 ad.u.net.family = family;
3840 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3842 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3848 switch (isec->sclass) {
3849 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3850 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3853 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3854 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3857 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3858 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3862 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3866 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3870 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3871 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3872 ad.u.net.family = family;
3874 if (family == PF_INET)
3875 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3877 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3879 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3880 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3888 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3890 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3891 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3894 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3899 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3901 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3902 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3903 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3904 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3905 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3906 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3907 unsigned short snum;
3910 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3911 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3912 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3914 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3916 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3917 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3919 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3922 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3926 perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3927 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3929 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3930 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3931 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3932 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3937 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
3943 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3945 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3948 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3951 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3952 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3954 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3958 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3960 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3961 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3962 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3963 newisec->initialized = 1;
3968 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3973 rc = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3977 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(SOCK_INODE(sock), MAY_WRITE);
3980 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3981 int size, int flags)
3983 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3986 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3988 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3991 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3993 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3996 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
4000 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
4004 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
4007 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
4010 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4013 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4015 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4018 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
4019 struct socket *other,
4022 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4023 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4024 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
4025 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4028 err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
4032 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4033 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
4035 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4036 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
4038 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
4040 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4044 /* connecting socket */
4045 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4046 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
4048 /* server child socket */
4049 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
4050 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
4051 err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
4056 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4057 struct socket *other)
4059 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4060 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
4061 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4064 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4065 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
4067 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4068 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
4070 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
4071 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
4078 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
4080 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
4086 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4089 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4090 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4094 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4097 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4098 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4101 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4102 struct sk_buff *skb,
4103 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4108 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4110 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, recv_perm;
4111 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4113 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4114 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4117 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4118 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
4119 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
4120 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4122 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4123 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
4124 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
4125 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4127 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4128 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_RECV;
4129 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_RECV;
4130 recv_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4133 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
4134 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
4139 err = sel_netif_sid(skb->iif, &if_sid);
4142 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4146 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4149 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4155 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4156 ntohs(ad->u.net.sport), &port_sid);
4157 if (unlikely(err)) {
4159 "SELinux: failure in"
4160 " selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(),"
4161 " network port label not found\n");
4164 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, recv_perm, ad);
4167 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4171 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4173 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4174 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4177 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4178 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4179 ad.u.net.family = family;
4180 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4184 if (selinux_compat_net)
4185 err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, &ad,
4187 else if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4188 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4193 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
4194 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4197 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
4198 SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad);
4200 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4202 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4205 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4211 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4214 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4215 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4216 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4217 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4222 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4225 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4226 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4229 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4230 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4231 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4232 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4233 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4234 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4236 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4237 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4238 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4241 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4242 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4243 ad.u.net.family = family;
4244 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4248 if (peerlbl_active) {
4251 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4254 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->iif, addrp, family,
4257 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4260 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4263 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4266 if (secmark_active) {
4267 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4276 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4277 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4282 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4283 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4284 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4286 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4288 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4289 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
4290 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4291 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4293 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
4298 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4303 if (scontext_len > len) {
4308 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4312 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4320 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4322 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4325 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4327 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4330 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4334 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4335 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4337 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4340 *secid = peer_secid;
4341 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4346 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4348 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
4351 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4353 sk_free_security(sk);
4356 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4358 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
4359 struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
4361 newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
4362 newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4363 newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
4365 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec, newsk->sk_family);
4368 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4371 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4373 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4375 *secid = sksec->sid;
4379 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4381 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4382 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4384 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4385 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4386 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4387 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4390 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4391 struct request_sock *req)
4393 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4395 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4399 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4400 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4403 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4406 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4407 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4408 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4412 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4416 req->secid = newsid;
4417 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4421 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4422 const struct request_sock *req)
4424 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4426 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4427 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4428 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4429 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4430 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4431 time it will have been created and available. */
4433 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4434 * thread with access to newsksec */
4435 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family);
4438 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4440 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4441 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4443 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4444 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4447 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4449 selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_established(sk, family);
4452 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4455 fl->secid = req->secid;
4458 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4462 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4463 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
4464 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4466 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4470 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4472 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4474 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4475 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4476 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4477 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4478 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
4479 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4489 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
4494 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4496 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4502 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4507 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4510 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4511 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4512 peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4513 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4516 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4519 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4520 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4521 ad.u.net.family = family;
4522 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4525 if (peerlbl_active) {
4526 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4529 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4535 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4536 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4540 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4541 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4542 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4544 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4550 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4551 struct sk_buff *skb,
4552 const struct net_device *in,
4553 const struct net_device *out,
4554 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4556 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4559 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4560 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4561 struct sk_buff *skb,
4562 const struct net_device *in,
4563 const struct net_device *out,
4564 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4566 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4570 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4575 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4578 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4579 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4580 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4582 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
4585 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4586 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4592 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
4593 struct sk_buff *skb,
4594 const struct net_device *in,
4595 const struct net_device *out,
4596 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4598 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4601 static int selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4603 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4604 u16 family, char *addrp)
4607 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4609 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, send_perm;
4610 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4612 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4613 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4616 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4617 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
4618 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
4619 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4621 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4622 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
4623 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
4624 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4626 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4627 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_SEND;
4628 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_SEND;
4629 send_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4632 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
4633 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
4638 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4641 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4644 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4647 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4654 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4655 ntohs(ad->u.net.dport), &port_sid);
4656 if (unlikely(err)) {
4658 "SELinux: failure in"
4659 " selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(),"
4660 " network port label not found\n");
4663 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, send_perm, ad);
4666 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4670 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4671 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4672 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4678 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4680 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4681 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4682 ad.u.net.family = family;
4683 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4686 if (selinux_compat_net) {
4687 if (selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(skb->sk, ifindex,
4688 &ad, family, addrp))
4690 } else if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4691 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4692 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4696 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4697 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4703 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4709 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4714 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4715 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4716 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4717 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4718 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4719 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4721 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4722 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4723 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4724 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4725 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4726 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4727 if (skb->dst != NULL && skb->dst->xfrm != NULL)
4730 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4731 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4732 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4735 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4736 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4737 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4738 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4743 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_FORWARDED)
4744 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4746 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4749 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_FORWARDED)
4750 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4752 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4757 if (secmark_perm == PACKET__FORWARD_OUT) {
4758 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4761 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4763 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4764 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4765 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4768 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4769 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4770 ad.u.net.family = family;
4771 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
4775 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4776 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4779 if (peerlbl_active) {
4783 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4785 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4786 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4789 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4791 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4792 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4799 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4800 struct sk_buff *skb,
4801 const struct net_device *in,
4802 const struct net_device *out,
4803 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4805 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4808 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4809 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4810 struct sk_buff *skb,
4811 const struct net_device *in,
4812 const struct net_device *out,
4813 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4815 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4819 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4821 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4825 err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
4829 if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
4830 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4835 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4838 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4840 err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4844 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4845 ad.u.cap = capability;
4847 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
4848 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4851 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4852 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4855 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4858 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4862 sid = task_sid(task);
4863 isec->sclass = sclass;
4865 perm->security = isec;
4870 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4872 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4873 perm->security = NULL;
4877 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4879 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4881 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4885 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4886 msg->security = msec;
4891 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4893 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4895 msg->security = NULL;
4899 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4902 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4903 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4904 u32 sid = current_sid();
4906 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4908 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4909 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4911 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4914 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4916 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4919 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4921 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4924 /* message queue security operations */
4925 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4927 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4928 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4929 u32 sid = current_sid();
4932 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4936 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4938 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4939 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4941 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4944 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4950 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4952 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4955 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4957 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4958 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4959 u32 sid = current_sid();
4961 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4963 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4964 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4966 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4967 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4970 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4978 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4979 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4982 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4985 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4988 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4994 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4998 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
5000 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5001 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5002 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5003 u32 sid = current_sid();
5006 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5007 msec = msg->security;
5010 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
5012 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
5014 * Compute new sid based on current process and
5015 * message queue this message will be stored in
5017 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
5023 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5024 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5026 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
5027 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5030 /* Can this process send the message */
5031 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
5034 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
5035 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5036 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
5041 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
5042 struct task_struct *target,
5043 long type, int mode)
5045 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5046 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5047 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5048 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
5051 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5052 msec = msg->security;
5054 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5055 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5057 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
5058 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
5060 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
5061 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
5065 /* Shared Memory security operations */
5066 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5068 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5069 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5070 u32 sid = current_sid();
5073 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
5077 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5079 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5080 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5082 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5085 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5091 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5093 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5096 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
5098 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5099 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5100 u32 sid = current_sid();
5102 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5104 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5105 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5107 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5108 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5111 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5112 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
5120 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5121 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5124 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
5127 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5134 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5140 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5144 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5145 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5150 rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
5154 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5157 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5159 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5162 /* Semaphore security operations */
5163 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5165 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5166 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5167 u32 sid = current_sid();
5170 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5174 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5176 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5177 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5179 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5182 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5188 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5190 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5193 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5195 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5196 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5197 u32 sid = current_sid();
5199 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5201 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5202 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5204 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5205 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5208 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5209 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5217 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5218 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5222 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5233 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5236 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5240 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5246 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5250 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5251 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5256 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5260 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5263 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5269 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5271 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5276 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5279 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5281 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5285 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5288 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5291 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5292 char *name, char **value)
5294 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5300 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5306 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5308 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5310 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5312 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5313 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5314 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5315 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5316 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5317 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5318 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5319 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5327 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5337 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5338 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5340 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5341 struct task_struct *tracer;
5348 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5349 security attributes. */
5354 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5355 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5356 * above restriction is ever removed.
5358 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5359 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5360 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5361 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5362 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5363 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5364 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5365 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5366 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5367 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5373 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5374 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5375 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5379 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5380 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5381 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5383 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5390 new = prepare_creds();
5394 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5395 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5396 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5397 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5398 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5399 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5400 tsec = new->security;
5401 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5402 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5403 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5404 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5405 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5406 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5409 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5410 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5411 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5412 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5417 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5419 if (!is_single_threaded(p)) {
5420 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5425 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5426 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5427 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5431 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5432 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5435 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p);
5437 ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5441 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5442 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5461 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5463 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5466 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5468 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5471 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5478 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5479 unsigned long flags)
5481 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5482 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5484 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5488 tsec = cred->security;
5489 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5490 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5492 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5498 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5500 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5506 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5507 const struct cred *cred,
5511 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5514 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5515 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5516 appear to be created. */
5520 sid = cred_sid(cred);
5522 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5523 ksec = key->security;
5525 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5528 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5530 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5531 char *context = NULL;
5535 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5544 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5547 .ptrace_may_access = selinux_ptrace_may_access,
5548 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5549 .capget = selinux_capget,
5550 .capset = selinux_capset,
5551 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
5552 .capable = selinux_capable,
5553 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5554 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5555 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5556 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5558 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5559 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
5561 .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds,
5562 .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
5563 .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
5564 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5566 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5567 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5568 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5569 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5570 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5571 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5572 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5573 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5574 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5575 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5576 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5579 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5580 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5581 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5582 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5583 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5584 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5585 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5586 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5587 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5588 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5589 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5590 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5591 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5592 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5593 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5594 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5595 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5596 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5597 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5598 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5599 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5600 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5601 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5602 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5603 .inode_need_killpriv = selinux_inode_need_killpriv,
5604 .inode_killpriv = selinux_inode_killpriv,
5605 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5607 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5608 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5609 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5610 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5611 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
5612 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5613 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5614 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5615 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5616 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5617 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5619 .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
5621 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5622 .cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
5623 .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare,
5624 .cred_commit = selinux_cred_commit,
5625 .kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as,
5626 .kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
5627 .task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid,
5628 .task_fix_setuid = selinux_task_fix_setuid,
5629 .task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid,
5630 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5631 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5632 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5633 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5634 .task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups,
5635 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5636 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5637 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5638 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5639 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5640 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5641 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5642 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5643 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5644 .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl,
5645 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5647 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5648 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5650 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5651 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5653 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5654 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5655 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5656 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5657 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5658 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5660 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5661 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5662 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5663 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5664 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5666 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5667 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5668 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5669 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5670 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5672 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5674 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5675 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5677 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5678 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5679 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5681 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5682 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5684 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5685 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5686 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5687 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5688 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5689 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5690 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5691 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5692 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5693 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5694 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5695 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5696 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5697 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5698 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5699 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5700 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5701 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5702 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5703 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5704 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5705 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5706 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5707 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5708 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5710 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5711 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5712 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5713 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5714 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5715 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5716 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5717 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5718 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5719 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5720 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5724 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5725 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5726 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5727 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5731 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5732 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5733 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5734 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5738 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5740 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5741 selinux_enabled = 0;
5745 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5746 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5750 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5752 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5753 cred_init_security();
5755 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5756 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5757 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5760 secondary_ops = security_ops;
5762 panic("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
5763 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5764 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5766 if (selinux_enforcing)
5767 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5769 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5774 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5776 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5778 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5779 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5780 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5781 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5783 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
5784 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
5785 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
5786 struct superblock_security_struct,
5788 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
5790 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5791 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5792 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
5794 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5796 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5797 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5798 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
5801 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5802 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5805 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5806 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5807 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5809 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5811 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5813 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5814 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5816 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5817 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5820 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5821 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5823 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5824 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5827 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
5828 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5830 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
5831 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5835 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5837 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5839 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5840 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5842 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5843 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5846 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5847 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5849 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5850 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5856 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5860 if (!selinux_enabled)
5863 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5865 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5867 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5869 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5870 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5872 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5879 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5881 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5882 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5884 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5886 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5887 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5888 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5893 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5895 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5896 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5899 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5901 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5902 static int selinux_disabled;
5904 int selinux_disable(void)
5906 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5908 if (ss_initialized) {
5909 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5913 if (selinux_disabled) {
5914 /* Only do this once. */
5918 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5920 selinux_disabled = 1;
5921 selinux_enabled = 0;
5923 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
5924 security_ops = secondary_ops;
5926 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5927 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5929 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */